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ABSTRACT 
This chapter reviews and discusses rational-choice approaches to organizational 
governance. These approaches are found primarily in organizational economics (virtually 
no rational-choice organizational sociology exists), particularly in transaction cost 
economics, principal-agent theory, and the incomplete-contracts or property-rights 
approach. We distill the main unifying characteristics of these streams, survey each 
stream, and offer some critical commentary and suggestions for moving forward.  
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 INTRODUCTION: ORGANIZATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
As Herbert Simon (1991: 27) noted, a mythical Martian, equipped with a telescope that reveals 
social structures and approaching the earth from space, would recognize organizations, rather than 
connecting markets, as “the dominant feature of the landscape”. And yet, Simon noted, 
organizations and organizational governance have been offered comparatively little attention by 
social scientists. Things have certainly improved research-wise since Simon wrote; in particular, 
rational-choice approaches to organizations, mainly prevalent in economics, have become large and 
important fields of research.  It is characteristic of such approaches that they are concerned with 
examining the wide variety of observed modes of organizational governance in the context of an 
efficiency perspective, thus throwing light on such topical issues as outsourcing, offshoring, 
downsizing, new organizational forms, and the increased use high-powered performance, in 
addition to the more traditional issues of the determinants of the existence and boundaries of the 
firm (Coase, 1937). This chapter surveys and discusses rational-choice approaches to these 
manifestations of organizational governance.   
It will prove useful to begin by clarifying the subject matter of this chapter, “organizational 
governance,” particularly since the term, although quite a fitting one, does not appear to enjoy 
particularly widespread use. As a first approximation, organizational governance refers to the 
instruments of governance that organizations may deploy in order to influence organizational 
members and other stakeholders to contribute to organizational goals. This understanding is 
clearly consistent with the more frequently used notions of “organizational control” and 
“governance structures and mechanisms.” As traditionally understood, these notions refer to 
mechanisms inside and between organizations that may influence behaviours in desired 
directions (Scott, 1992; Williamson, 1996). In terms of positioning in the space of scientific 
fields, there is, strictly speaking no distinct field of “organizational governance,” but a set of 
(partly overlapping) fields and sub-fields of “organization theory,” “organizational studies,” 
“organizational behaviour,” “organizational economics,” “the theory of the firm” and “corporate 
governance” that more or less eclectically draw on the base disciplines of sociology, 
psychology, political science, and economics. Organizational governance as defined above 
relates to and partly overlaps with all of these fields.  
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However, adopting a rational-choice perspective (Coleman, 1990; Abell, 1991; Sugden, 
1991) on organizational governance shrinks the set of fields and sub-fields that are relevant to 
organizational governance considerably. Thus, large parts of organizational studies and 
organizational behaviour fall outside such a perspective. Indeed, the construction of contrasts 
with “rational” perspectives on organizations and with rational-choice approaches to action and 
behaviour have been rhetorical practices within organization studies for a long time (e.g., March 
and Simon, 1958; Scott, 1992). A rational-choice perspective on organizational governance 
suggests the following understanding of organizational governance:  
Organizational governance concerns how agents, pursuing their own interests, 
and differing in terms of preferences, knowledge/information and endowments, 
may deploy instruments of control and influence to regulate their transactions in 
order to avoid problems of coordination and/or motivation that they may 
confront when they interact within or through the purposefully designed social 
systems known as “organizations.”  
“Instruments of control” should be understood in a general sense, as including “hard” 
(managerial authority and formal incentive systems) as well as “soft” means 
(culture,psychological contracts, framing) means of controlling and influencing behaviour. 
Behaviour, and therefore ultimately organizational outcomes, may be influenced through 
influencing the motivations, beliefs, preferences and information of organizational members.  
The above is obviously a highly abstract definition; an unpacking will be undertaken later. 
However, note for the moment that the definition involves a notion of rational design 
(undertaken to reach preferred outcomes) takes individual agents as the relevant decision-
makers (rather than “the organization”), conceptualize these agents as sufficiently clever to 
recognize the interaction problems they may face, and (implicitly) frame these problems in 
game theoretical terms. All of these features are entirely consistent, indeed key, in the rational-
choice approach. In terms of the phenomenon, organizational governance includes but is broader 
than the notion of “organizational control.” The latter notion mainly refers to the governance of 
human capital inputs inside an organization (and sometimes only with the monitoring and 
evaluation of human capital services), and implies a notion of the corporate person of the firm as 
the principal and human capital owners as agents. The notion of organizational governance is 
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broader in that it includes a broader set of stakeholders, such as owners of capital and input 
suppliers.  
A concern with how control may be exercised by organizations and managers has a 
considerably longer history in sociology than in economics. Although early economics 
contributions ― particularly Knight (1921) and Coase (1937) ― were contemporaneous with 
the emerging interest in sociology in this issue (e.g., Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939), the 
economics treatments were more highly abstract and entirely non-empirical. More importantly, 
the pioneering contributions of Knight and Coase were only recognized as seminal several 
decades after they were published. In contrast, organizational sociology “coalesced” in the 
1950s (Scott, 2004), that is, at a time when few economists took an interest in organizations (but 
see Simon, 1951; Downs, 1957), and about two decades prior to a sustained attempt to apply the 
tools of economics to the study of organizations. Important early contributions were made by 
Selznick (1949), Crozier (1963), and later influential work is represented by Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978), but most of this has remained fairly resistant to rational-choice approaches 
(perhaps except for Crozier and his followers). In fact, organizational sociologists have often 
been very strongly critical (e.g., Perrow, 1986, 2002; but see, e.g., Scott [1995] for a more 
conciliatory approach). There is little rational-choice sociology literature that deals with 
organizational governance,1 and also little relevant political science literature (but see Hammond 
and Miller, 1985; Miller, 1992). The part of “rational” organizational theory approaches (Scott, 
1992) that is often called the “Carnegie(-Mellon school)” (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and 
March, 1963) to a large extent emerged from a friendly and immanent critique of the rational-
choice model. While this may not be rational-choice theory proper, it is sufficiently close, and 
did inspire some important rational-choice work (Williamson, 1996: Chpt. 1) to warrant 
commentary and reference throughout this chapter. However, the fact remains that the main 
manifestation of a rational-choice approach to organizational governance is organizational 
economics, and the chapter is therefore mainly taken up with this research stream.  
The design of the chapter is as follows. We begin by providing a brief primer on 
organizational governance as conceptualized from a rational-choice perspective. The focus is on 
                                                 
1 However, some parts of Lawler’s work come close (e.g., Lawler, 2002). Siegwart Lindenberg’s work (e..g, 
Lindenberg (2003) may also be invoked, although Lindenberg’s rational choice model is one that takes into account 
framing and other psychological effects often disregarded in “pure” rational choice work.   
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the key features that are shared by rational-choice approaches. These are illustrated by means of 
a simple game theoretical example. We then provide a more detailed overview and discussion of 
the various currents in the field, largely organized chronologically and around the main 
contributions to the various streams.  We end by discussing empirical evidence as well as 
various critiques and the relation to more organizational sociology.  
An important proviso must finally be mentioned: The following primarily deals with 
organizations that are designed for a commercial purpose, first, because the largest part of the 
existing, relevant work deals with such organizations, and, second, because these organizations 
are simpler to deal with as their objective function is (in principle, at least) simpler. However, 
mention will be made of rational choice on government bureucracies.  
ORGANIZATIONAL GOVERNANCE FROM A RATIONAL-CHOICE 
PERSPECTIVE: A PRIMER 
Organizations 
In their classic Organizations March and Simon (1958) broadly define organizations as 
systems of coordinated action among individuals who differ in the dimensions of interests, 
preferences, and knowledge. Many writers have echoed this understanding (e.g., Arrow, 1974; 
Mintzberg, 1979). However, a problem with the definition is that it would seem to include what 
Hayek (1973) calls “spontaneous orders,” that is, those orderly structures and states that are the 
unintended results of the interaction of intentional individuals. For example, a competitive 
equilibrium is indeed a pattern of coordinated action among agents who differ in the said 
dimensions, where the actions taken, and therefore the resulting allocation is a result of the 
specific institutions (“systems”) under which trade takes place. At some level, this may perhaps 
be called an “organization,” and indeed economics work on mechanism design would seem to 
bring such allocations within the orbit of conscious design (Hurwicz, 1973; Arrow, 1974). 
However, the allocation that results is, strictly speaking, an unintended consequence of 
intentional actions (Buchanan, 1979; Coleman, 1991).  
Relatedly, it is customary (and enlightening) to make a distinction between “organizations” 
and “institutions” (Coase, 1937; Hayek, 1973; North, 1990; Coleman 1991; Williamson, 1996; 
Scott, 1995). The former are purposively constructed for specific ends and on the basis of 
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specific rules (“made orders,” in Hayek’s [1973] terminology), whereas the latter may be 
emergent, are based on abstract rules, and are not constructed for specific purposes 
(“spontaneous orders”) (Hayek, 1973; Coleman, 1991). The subjects of this chapter are 
organizations in the former sense, particularly those that are constructed for a commercial 
purpose, that is, firms.  
Rational-choice approaches to organizational governance share a strong design ambition 
with a number of approaches in organization theory (notably contingency theory).  Many of the 
root sources of modern formal work in this vein ⎯ notably implementation theory and 
mechanism design theory (Guesnerie, 1992.) ⎯ are thus fundamentally design-oriented 
analytical enterprises (cf. also Bowles, 2004). Design approaches in organization studies have 
often been criticized for focusing all the attention on formal organization to the neglect of (the 
potentially far more important) informal organization, a critique going back to the Hawthorne 
experiments (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939; Gillespie, 1991) and Barnard (1938). Although 
the preoccupation in rational-choice work on organizational governance with property rights, 
ownership, contracts, incentives, etc. may seem to reflect a similar bias, this is in fact hardly the 
case. Thus, scholars in the field have been busy studying power (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), 
leadership (Hermalin, 1998; Jones and Olken, 2005; Majumdar and Mukand, 2007), attempts at 
influencing hierarchical superiors (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988a), informal authority (Aghion 
and Tirole, 1997), corporate culture (Jones, 1983; Kreps, 1990; Cremer, 1990), and 
psychological contracts (Foss, 2003; Foss, Foss and Vasquez, 2006). The underlying conjecture 
is that such “soft” phenomena can be studied using exactly the same methods, tools, and 
fundamental conceptualization of agents that are applied to the study of the “harder,” more 
formal aspects of organization, in contrast to scholars in organization studies who, for example, 
often stress the need for invoking “multiple rationalities” (e.g., Dyck, 1997).  
However, it should be noted that the organization/institution distinction is somewhat vague. 
Note that there are cases that are not easy to classify, such as firm networks that mix the planned 
and the emergent and where governing rules are partly abstract and partly specific.  More 
generally, the organization/institution distinction should be thought of as end points of a 
spectrum. Thus, many organizations, particularly large ones, embody elements of the 
spontaneous order. Fundamentally, they do so, because large firms, like whole economies, 
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embody a fundamental division of knowledge that makes an efficient centralization of dispersed 
knowledge in the hands of a centralizing authority prohibitively costly, and perhaps even 
impossible, given the tacit nature of much relevant knowledge (Foss, 1999). Such organizations 
must provide rules ⎯ and often rather abstract one as in the case of corporate cultures (Kreps, 
1990) ⎯ in the expectation that beneficial, but partly unforeseen outcomes will result (Hayek, 
1973).  Moreover, there are cases in which elements of hierarchy, such as extensive information 
exchange and authority-like relations, are clearly prevalent in market relations, as in the case of 
franchising (see further, Imai and Itami, 1985; Langlois, 1995). 
Governance Structures and Governance Mechanisms 
In his extremely influential version of transaction cost economics, Williamson (1985, 1996) 
argues that organizational governance is a specific form of “governance structure,” namely the 
one that he terms “hierarchy.” Williamson argues that governance structures can be classified in 
the categories of either the market, the hybrid or the.2 These categories exhaust all possible 
governance structures without remainder. Williamson defines governance structures as 
mechanisms for (mainly) settling ex post (i.e., after contract agreement) disputes, and predicts 
that forward-looking agents will adopt the governance structures that is best suited to handle the 
transaction(s) they carry out between them. Thus, contractual relations are embedded in 
governance structures. Borrowing from Simon’s (1962) discussion of marginal analysis versus 
comparative analysis of systems, and perhaps also borrowing from the traditional emphasis in 
design oriented organization theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1974) on 
complementarities between organizational elements, Williamson thinks of such structures as 
four tuples, consisting of the “attributes” of incentive intensity, administrative controls, how 
adaptation to external change is handled (i.e., whether in an “autonomous” or a “coordinated” 
manner), and contract law.  These attributes are “governance mechanisms,” that is, the 
mechanisms within a governance structures that actually coordinates activities and aligns 
interests. While governance structures can vary within a category ⎯ thus, the hierarchy 
structure encompasses the M-form, the U-form, matrix forms and much else ⎯  it still remains 
that the hierarchy, in contrast to the market, makes use of its own contract law (what Williamson 
                                                 
2 Williamson’s notion may not be entirely fortunate for those firms that are largely non-hierarchical, namely 
partnerships. 
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calls “forbearance”), deploys  (relatively) low-powered incentives, adapts to disturbances in a 
coordinated manner, and can deploy a rich administrative machinery (Williamson, 1996: Chpt. 
4).  
The of a strong complementary between such attributes has been subjected to a forceful 
critique by Grandori (1997, 2001) who argues that the set of coordination mechanisms is larger 
than portrayed by Williamson (it also encompasses voting, teaming, negotiation and norms and 
rules) and that Williamson grossly exaggerates complementarities between such mechanisms. 
She presents theoretical arguments as well as empirical arguments that governance structures are 
much less discrete than portrayed by Williamson. Rather than explaining the 
existence/emergence of particular discrete governance structures, Grandori rather sees the 
explanatory problem as one of explaining why particular governance mechanisms are bundled in 
specific ways to handle specific transactions and activities. Thus, she is more interested in the 
“micro-organization” of specific governance mechanisms than the more macro issue of 
governance structures.  
These positions are summarized here in order to indicate that the problem of “explaining 
organizational governance” is far from being unambiguous. What exactly is the explanandum is 
author-dependent as well as dependent on belonging to specific sub-fields within organizational 
economics. Thus, initial/pioneering work in organizational economics saw the task as one of 
explaining the emergence of the employment contract in a market economy (Coase, 1937; 
Simon, 1951), that is, essentially one governance mechanism (authority) and its contractual (and 
perhaps legal, cf. Coase, 1937) underpinning. Williamson’s work shifted the focus to 
governance structures, changing the explanatory task to not only explaining the efficiency 
rationales of specific governance mechanisms but also why they are clustered in discrete 
governance structures, and much work in contract economics has, following Milgrom and 
Roberts (1990) and Holmström and Milgrom (1994), taken a similar approach, stressing the 
notion of (Edgeworth) complementarities (Weiss, 2007). The highly influential property rights 
approach associated with Hart and Moore in particular (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and 
Moore, 1990) brought back simplicity in the sense that the analytical effort was concentrated on 
explaining the allocation of ownership rights (and therefore authority), and sidestepping the 
issue of governance structures as discrete bundles of interlocking governance mechanisms. 
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Finally, some writers, notably Grandori (1997), has emphasized explaining the rationales of the 
specific mechanisms that may make up a particular instance of organizational governance, and 
giving pretensions of strong complementarities between such elements.  
Why Does Organizational Governance Emerge?  
James Coleman (1990, 1991) argues that firms exist for the same reason that money does: 
They reduce the problem of the “double coincidence of wants.” Thus, Coleman adopts the 
counterfactual approach characteristic of rational-choice approaches to organizational 
governance: Organizational governance exists because markets “fail” (transactions are very 
costly to carry out) and governing transactions inside organizations is superior to market 
contracting (both are necessary conditions). However, while Coleman may identify a possible 
benefit of organizations, this benefit is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the 
existence of organized entities. Specifically, Coleman does not provide a reason why such 
benefits cannot be realized through (possibly sophisticated) market contracting. Indeed, if there 
are no frictions to market contracting, there are no reasons why markets should not be capable 
of doing exactly this. The inference that monetary theorists have drawn from such reasoning is 
that a medium of exchange exists because of “transaction costs” (Starr, 2003.). Organizational 
economists have made a similar inference.  
While the set of rational-choice approaches to organizational governance contains 
heterogeneous elements, all approaches may be at least reconstructed as beginning from the 
premise that it is necessary to throw some analytical monkey wrenches into the machinery of the 
perfectly competitive model (of Debreu, 1959) to explain the raison d’etre of organizational 
governance. This clearly unites all economics approaches, from Knight (1921) (where the 
argument is set particularly clearly out), over Coase (1937) and his transaction cost successors 
(Williamson, 1996) to modern contract theory (Salanié, 1997; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). 
While the relevant frictions come in many forms, from (genuine) uncertainty (Knight, 1921), 
imperfect foresight/bounded rationality (Coase, 1937; Kreps, 1996; MacLeod, 2002), small 
numbers bargaining (Williamson, 1996), haggling costs (Coase, 1937), private information 
(Holmström, 1979), cost of processing information (Marschak and Radner, 1972; Aoki, 1986; 
Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994) or inspecting quality (Barzel, 1982, 1997), imperfect legal 
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enforcement (Hart, 1995; Williamson, 1996) etc., what is common to them all is that they make 
contracting imperfect relative to the full complete contingent contracting model (Debreu, 1959).   
The consequence of imperfect contracting is, usually, that created value (“welfare,” 
“wealth”) falls short of the maximum that is imaginable. Thus, a first-best situation is taken as a 
benchmark The typical benchmark invoked by rational-choice scholars working on 
organizational governance is ⎯ in spite of the heavy methodological critiques of, for example, 
Demsetz (1969) against this “Nirvana approach” ⎯  the value creation that would have obtained 
if agents had been interacting in an entirely friction-less setting. Such settings may be 
represented by the conditions underlying the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960) or the first theorem 
of welfare economics (Debreu, 1959). Under these conditions maximum value creation obtains; 
thus, it is not possible to rearrange resource uses, coalitions, etc. so that more economic value is 
produced. A notable feature of these situations is that they are, to a large extent, institutionally 
and organizationally neutral, in the sense that unconstrained market competition based on 
privately held property rights will implement the optimal allocation ⎯ as will full scale 
socialism. By a similar token, whether resources are primarily allocated by firms or by markets 
does not, strictly speaking, matter for allocational outcomes.3   
Of course, such first best efficiency conditions never obtain in actuality, and institutions and 
allocations are therefore not neutral in allocational terms. (The connotation to the theory of 
market failure should be obvious). Moreover, different institutions and organizations, 
embodying different mechanisms for governing inputs, typically have different allocational 
consequences, depending on the specifics of the situation (i.e., what is assumed about 
transactions, property rights, informational conditions, etc.). Indeed, a key heuristic that 
underlies all rational-choice approaches to organizational governance is that of matching the 
relevant unit of analysis (whether this is a transaction, an activity, or an input) can be assigned 
to a member of the set of organizational alternatives (whether governance structure or a 
governance mechanism) on the basis of some efficiency criterion, what Williamson (1985) calls 
“discriminating alignment.” It is typically forwarded, often in an “as if” manner, that rational 
                                                 
3 Nevertheless, it is usually argued that with perfect and costless contracting, it is hard to see room for anything 
resembling organizations. In fact, it is held that even one-person firms would not exist under such conditions, since 
consumers could contract directly with owners of factors services and would not need the services of the 
intermediaries (i.e., firms) (e.g., Cheung, 1983).  
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agents are efficiency seeking agents, and that changing a situation with inefficient alignment of, 
for example, transactions and governance structures to one with efficient alignment will create 
so much extra transferable utility that potential losers from the change can be compensated (e.g., 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). If transaction costs are such that efficiency-improving changes 
cannot be made, inefficient organizational choices may instead be weeded out by other forces, 
notably selection forces (Williamson, 1985).  
Note in passing that it is, of course, such matching processes that give explanatory and 
predictive content to rational-choice approaches to organizations. To be sure, discriminating 
alignment is not a feature of these approaches alone. Organizational sociologists and 
management scholars working on organization theory, notably those working from a 
“contingency” or “information processing perspective” (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1974) have stressed notions of “fit,” typically of organizational 
structures and environmental conditions. However, these approaches only implicitly make use 
of efficiency as the criterion of discrimination, are macro (organization-level), and seldom spend 
much time on characterizing agents in cognitive and motivational terms.4   
The argument that organizational governance arises when markets fail for certain 
transactions or activities and organizations are superior means of governing these transactions or 
activities does not in itself inform us about the involved mechanisms, and without specification 
of such mechanisms borders on the tautological. Obviously, scholars have spent much energy on 
identifying and theorizing the relevant mechanisms. The Leitmotiv of the relevant work over the 
last three decades has been that of incentive conflicts emerging from prisoners’ dilemma-like 
situations. Some rational-choice work in the field of organizations have taken a team theoretical 
starting point (Marschak and Radner, 1972; Aoki, 1986; Radner, 1986; Bolton and Dewatripont, 
1994), or have started out from pure common interest games (Camerer and Knez, 1996); 
accordingly, such work downplay incentive issues. However, it is usually argued, and generally 
agreed, that while this approach can further the understanding of those aspects internal 
organization that relate to information processing, it cannot explain the existence and boundaries 
of organizations (Williamson 1985; Hart, 1995; Foss, 1996). To see how incentives may conflict 
                                                 
4 Notions of agents as information processors and as facing attention allocation problems are sometimes loosely 
developed, but such insights are seldom cast within an overall optimizing logic.  Moreover, motivational issues are 
seldom highlighted in this branch of organizational theory.  
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in a non-organizational (market, small numbers bargaining) context, and how organizational 
governance can remedy particular kinds of incentive conflicts, but possibly also introduce new 
ones, consider a simple example. 
An Example 
The example (which is borrowed from Wernerfelt, 1994) lays out the basic logic of 
“incomplete contracting” theory, one of the dominant current in organizational economics. The 
specifics cannot automatically be transferred to other approaches, but the fundamental reasoning 
and assumptions are quite similar. The example is illustrated by the strategic-form games shown 
in Figure 1.   
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Figure 1 Here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Following Hurwicz (1972), one can imagine economic agents choosing game forms, and the 
resulting equilibria, for regulating their trade. Although the example only highlights two agents 
(players), “B” can initially be taken as representative of a number of potential agents (e.g., 
firms) that might want to cooperate with A. That is, “large numbers” conditions obtain, and we 
can think of the situation as taking place, at least initially, in a market setting.  
Assume that agents initially want to regulate such trade under conditions where they 
maintain their independence (i.e., they are distinct legal persons). Efficiency requires that agents 
choose the game form and equilibrium that maximizes the gains from trade. The two players 
begin by confronting Game 1. In this game, the Pareto criterion is too weak to select a unique 
equilibrium, since both {up, left} and {down, right} may be equilibria on this criterion.  
However, the {down, right} equilibrium has a higher joint surplus than the {up, left} 
equilibrium, so that it will be in A’s interest to bribe B to play {right}. Surplus maximization 
suggests that this equilibrium is the agents’ preferred one. Their problem then is to design a 
contractual arrangement that will make choose strategies such this equilibrium results. Note that 
this problem captures the spirit of work on specific investments (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 
1978; Williamson, 1985; Hart, 1996) in which an agent (or possibly both agents) has to choose a 
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strategy (in this case {right}) that while surplus maximizing (when the other agent plays his 
best-response strategy) is not necessarily attractive for the agent (he only gets 1).  
The apparent solution is choose a side-payment, u, which can be chosen (1 < u < 2) to 
implement the equilibrium where A plays {down} and B plays {right}. If the contracting 
environment is such that this contract can be (costlessly) written and enforced, the agents will 
choose the efficient strategies. Apparently, there is no need for organizational governance as 
defined here, and the small numbers bargaining situation is viable.  
However, different contracting environments may give different results.  For example, it 
may be too costly to describe all contract stipulations in a comprehensive manner (e.g., “u” may 
be intangible, such as “goodwill”, and hard to precisely describe). This may happen because of 
information costs, the limitations of natural language, the unavoidable emergence of genuine 
novelties, etc. The contract ends up being incomplete. Or, while the parties may be sufficiently 
smart to write down all the manifold possible aspects of their relationship, a third party who is 
supposed to enforce the contract does not have the wits to efficiently enforce the contract (Hart, 
1990). In the latter case, contract terms are said to be “non-verifiable.” Or, the costs of 
contracting may outweigh the gains (Saussier, 2000). In all of these cases, it may not be possible 
to sustain the first-best outcome, that is, the one that unambiguously maximizes joint surplus. In 
the context of the example, A may confronted with a contingency that is not covered by the 
contract, refuse to pay B the bribe, and B may have no recourse. However, B may well have the 
wits to anticipate this possibility. Thus, the contract stipulating the side payment may not be 
sustainable in equilibrium (i.e., the outcome where the agents get [4-u, 1 +u] may not be sub-
game perfect). Value is destroyed relative to the optimal outcome, because B will not rationally 
choose {right}. 
Whether an efficient or an inefficient outcome occurs will in many situations be critically 
sensitive to the timing of the game. However, in the specific example, timing doesn’t really 
matter if the contracting environment is such that the promise to transfer u in return for B 
playing {right} is, for whatever reason, a non-enforceable one:  Thus, if A gives B the bribe 
before the game begins, B will not play {right}, which means that A will decide not to give B 
any bribe. And if A promises B to pay the bribe after game, B will realize that this will not be in 
A’s interest, and will still play {left}. This captures the idea that agents that anticipate 
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opportunism on the part of their contractual partner will refrain from taking efficient actions or 
making efficient investments. The bottomline is that contracts cannot completely safeguard 
against the reduction of surplus or loss of welfare stemming from incentive conflicts (given risk 
preferences).  
The analytical enterprise is therefore one of comparing alternative contracting arrangements, 
all of them imperfect. A specific contracting arrangement is represented by the authority 
relation. This obtains when one of the players becomes an employee, accepting the other 
player’s orders to play a specific strategy (e.g., {right}) against a compensation. In other words, 
the underlying idea is that transferring a transaction or activity from a market to an organization 
context means that the agreement will be honoured. According to, for example, Williamson 
(1985), the reason lies in a change of incentives: When an agent changes his status from 
independent entrepreneur to employee, he becomes less of a residual claimant. His incentives to 
engage in behaviour that results in suboptimal equilibria are correspondingly diminished. In 
terms of the example, B (or A) may have nothing to gain from playing {left} (rather than 
{right}) once he has assumed employee status, and will therefore obey A’s (B’s) orders. The 
law regulating labor transactions may reinforce such “docility” (Masten, 1988), to use Simon’s 
(1991) expression. Or, non-opportunistic behaviours may be sustained by the repeated nature of 
the employer-employee relation and the attendant build-up of valuable reputation capital (Kreps, 
1990, 1996).  
 Problems of Organizational Governance 
Internalizing a transaction or an activity, that is, transferring it from market to organizational 
governance, does not in general, however, allow the relevant players to reach the first-best 
situation. In fact, Hart (1995) essentially argues that hold-up of the kind discussed can still take 
place within the hierarchy,5 so that the problem of choosing efficient organizational (e.g., should 
A internalize B or vice versa or neither) becomes one of choosing the mode that minimizes 
losses from opportunistic hold-up. 
                                                 
5 Although the exact mechanisms through which this happens is somewhat opaque; perhaps one may imagine 
divisions holding each other up on transfer prices.  
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Moreover, if, as is usually realistic, asymmetric information conditions can be assumed to 
exist, “A internalizing B” (or vice versa) may merely transform the problem of contractual hold-
up into a problem of moral hazard, that is, B who has now assumed employee status faces 
lower-powered incentives relative to the situation in which he was an independent agent/residual 
claimant, and may therefore shirk his duties. Recourse to high-powered incentives may be 
sought to alleviate such moral hazard, but this may be problematic to the extent that the 
employee is engaged in multi-tasking and some tasks are costly to measure: The provision of 
incentives for measurable activities may imply that other activities are neglected (Holmström 
and Milgrom, 1991), such as the proper maintenance of equipment (Williamson, 1985; Barzel, 
1997; Hammond, 2000). In multi-tasking environments, high-powered incentives may therefore 
actually call forth morally hazardous behaviour.  
Note that such problems are not necessarily distinctly organizational. To be sure, the vast 
body of agency theory deals with incentive problems that may well beset internal organization; 
however, many of these problems, including multi-tasking problems, might also play out in a 
market context. However, organizations, or more narrowly, hierarchies, may be beset by distinct 
incentive problems. It is generally agreed that relatively little work has been done on 
organizational failures in this sense compared to the huge bodies of work on market failure (and 
political failure).  However, some exists, mainly relating to what may be called the “costs of 
authority.”  A key theme in much of the work that is discussed in the present chapter (e.g., 
Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1996; Wernerfelt, 1997) is that the exercise of managerial authority in 
response to changes in the environment or in response to conflicts that are internal to the 
organization provide reasons why firms exist. Thus, the implicit thrust of most of this work is 
that managerial authority is always beneficial.6 There are, however, various incentive costs to 
the exercise of authority. 
Rent-seeking. The best-known cost of authority is Milgrom and Roberts’s (1988a) notion of 
“influence activities” and their associated costs (derived from the political economy literature on 
                                                 
6 It is arguable that one reason for this is that there is a tendency in the literature to think of the exercise of authority 
as being highly informed so that the right to control translates into effective actual control over decisions (see Foss, 
2002). However, the right to decide need not confer effective control over decisions, as Aghion and Tirole (1997) 
point out. In their story real authority is determined by the structure of information in the organization. An increase 
in an agent’s real authority is assumed to promote initiative, but also to lead to control losses from the point of view 
of the principal.   
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rent-seeking). Influence activities are agent’s expenditures of time, effort, and tangible resources 
aimed at influencing decision makers to act in the agent’s favor.  The agent could be an 
individual seeking to curry favor with a supervisor, or a division manager seeking to acquire a 
greater share of corporate resources (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). Such behavior is costly to the 
firm not only because of the opportunity cost of the agent’s time, but also because the principal 
receives biased signals of the agent’s performance and characteristics. To minimize costly rent-
seeking firms can reduce the discretion of principals, relying on fixed rules (e.g., for promotions 
and favorable assignments) rather than the discretion of supervisors.  This reduces the 
principal’s ability to intervene where appropriate, however.  
Selective intervention. Williamson (1985: 132) raises a fundamental issue: “Why can’t a 
large firm do everything that a collection of small firms can do and more?” Consider two 
competing firms. Net gains may be expected from a merger, because of savings on overheads, 
economies of scale, coordination of pricing decisions, etc.  Little needs to change on the level of 
organization. What were previously autonomous firms may now be units with semi-autonomous 
status.  Importantly, incentives may be as high-powered as they were prior to integration. The 
decisions that are most efficiently made at the levels of operations will be made there. 
“Intervention at the top thus occurs selectively, which is to say only upon a showing of expected 
net gains” (Williamson 1985: 133).  This implies that the combined firm can do everything the 
stand-alone firms could and more, so that“… integration realizes adaptive gains but experiences 
no losses” (p.161).  Clearly, the argument implies that merger activity will go on until all 
economic activity is undertaken by one single firm. Since this flies in the face of the evidence, 
selective intervention must be associated with some “losses” that offset the benefits of 
integration at the margin.  
Williamson (1985: 161) points to various commitments problems that are accompany. Thus, 
it may be costly for the firm that takes over another firm to make it credible that it will honor 
promises regarding, for example, transfer prices or promotion prospects, the costliness 
stemming from a lack of third-party enforcement. Milgrom and Roberts (1996: 168) argue that 
“… the very existence of centralized authority is incompatible with a thorough going policy of 
efficient selective intervention.  The authority to intervene inevitably implies the authority to 
intervene inefficiently” (see also Coase [1937] on managerial mistakes).    
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In an attempt to flesh out such inefficient intervention Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) 
(theoretically), Foss (2003) and Foss, Foss and Vazquez (2006) (empirically) focus on 
managerial problems of committing to not over-ruling employees. Note that  managerial 
intervention will often not only consist of making those decisions that cannot be made on lower 
levels on the basis of existing routines, procedures, etc. (Selznick, 1957: Chpt. 1), but will 
typically also override existing instructions of employees (Tepper and Taylor, 2003). Moreover, 
in firms where employees are given considerable discretion, managerial intervention may 
amount to overruling decisions that employees have made on the basis of decision rights that 
have been delegated to them. This suggests that employee utility may be harmed by managerial 
intervention which damages motivation, so that net losses from such intervention are 
conceivable. From the point of view of organizational governance, the design problem is to 
maximize managerial intervention “for good cause (to support expected net gains) while 
minimizing managerial intervention “for bad [causes] (to support the subgoals of the 
intervenor)” (Williamson 1996: 150-151). Akin to Milgrom and Roberts’s (1988a) argument 
that a hierarchical structure minimizes rent-seeking by subordinates, Foss, Foss and Vasquez 
(2007) argue that traditional hierarchies have advantages with respect to limiting the incentive 
costs of managerial intervention.  Thus, while first-best selective intervention” is indeed strictly 
impossible, second-best intervention is feasible. 
Overall Characteristics of Rational-Choice Approaches to Organizational Governance 
The above normal form game representation has been chosen as an illustrative device not 
because game theory is a preferred analytical vehicle for doing organizational economics 
research, but because it helps to identify a number of the crucial underlying assumptions in 
organizational economics, assumptions that sharply differentiate organizational economics from 
other organization studies approaches.  
Methodological individualism. In accordance with its legacy in mainstream economics and 
its rational-choice methodology, organizational economics is entirely methodological 
individualist, and may even be argued to pursue a “hard” methodological individualist program: 
The aim is to explain contractual and organizational forms fully in terms of individual action and 
interaction (without remainder). While, of course, organizational incentives and other means of 
organizational governance influence the decision situations that organizational members find 
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themselves in, these organization level phenomena are fully explained in terms of individual 
action and interaction.  Moreover, “soft” organization-level constructs, such as “trust,” 
“embeddedness,” “organizational cognition,” “capabilities,” etc. are not part of the explanans of 
the modern theory of the firm, and are only rarely treated as explanandum phenomena (but see, 
e.g., Kreps [1990] on culture and Aghion and Tirole [1995] on core competence). These features 
arguably give organizational economics a “state of nature” or “under-socialized” character that 
has been subject to a great deal of critique (Granovetter, 1985; Freeman, 2002). They also set 
organizational economics apart from many other approaches in the overall the field of 
organization studies approaches, some of which are explicitly methodologically collectivist 
(Abell, Felin and Foss, 2007; Felin and Hesterly, 2007).   
Rationality and efficiency. It should be evident from the preceding that the material covered 
in this chapter falls within the orbit of what organizational sociologists (e.g., Scott, 1992) call 
“rational” organization theory approaches. The notion of “rational” as used by organizational 
sociologists usually involves a both more expansive and looser meaning than the one ascribed to 
it in organizational economics in which it strictly refers to properties of individual agents. 
Economists seldom apply the notion of rationality to supra-individual entities. Instead, they 
enter efficiency land. Arguably, this reflects economists’ strong commitment to methodological 
individualism, one of the uniting features of all rational-choice approaches to organizational 
governance. In terms of what is assumed about behaviour, all organizational economists are 
located within the rational-choice camp. To be sure, bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) has been 
invoked by many organizational economists, notably Williamson, but it is characteristic that the 
use that is actually made of bounded rationality is quite limited. For example, the attempt is not 
to characterize real decision-making (á la the Carnegie-Mellon approach to organization theory, 
March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963), but to use bounded rationality as an 
explanation of contractual incompleteness (Foss, 2003b). 
 Cognition.  Particularly in its formal versions (e.g., Holmström, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 
1986; Holmström and Milgrom, 1994) organizational economics follows standard economics in 
making strong assumptions about the cognitive powers of agents.  This reflects a strong reliance 
on information economics and game theory. Some formal organizational economists have 
argued that there is no need for bounded rationality (even in the above weak sense): The 
 20
contracting problems that are studied in organizational economics can be approached making 
use of the more tractable notion of asymmetric information (Hart, 1990). Relatedly, because of 
the Bayesian underpinning of game theoretical contract theory, “Knightian,” “deep,” “radical,” 
etc. uncertainty has no role to play. (In the above representation, players can thus never be 
surprised). Even those organizational economists who have taken an interest in behavioural 
decision theory (e.g. MacLeod, 2002) have not in general strayed far from the paradigmatic 
expected utility model. 
Much is taken to be given. In existing research, and reflecting the modeling approach of the 
literature, much is taken as given or “frozen” (Foss and Foss, 2000). The particular idealizations 
that are performed in the literature take several forms. For example, because of the strong 
assumptions that are made with respect to agents’ cognitive powers, decision situations are 
always unambiguous and “given.” The choice of efficient economic organization is portrayed as 
a standard maximization problem in the case of contract design or as a choice between given 
“discrete, structural alternatives” (Williamson 1996a) in the case of the choice of governance 
structures. There is no learning and no need for entrepreneurial discovery.  In the above 
representation, strategies are thus given.  
Motivation. Motivation is assumed to be wholly extrinsic (Frey, 1997); hence, stronger 
monetary incentives always call forth more effort (in a least one dimension). Moreover, 
motivation is entirely self-directed (i.e., there are no other-regarding preferences) (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000). Finally, preferences are taken as given, and organizational governance has no 
role in shaping preferences. Organizational governance only shapes extrinsic motivation  and 
possibly beliefs (because of signaling, see, e.g., Kreps, 1990; Benabou and Tirole, year).  
The function of economic organization. Problems of economic organization may in generic 
terms be represented as games where the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal.  While this 
formally includes, for example, coordination games of the stag-hunt variety (Camerer and Knez 
1996), the main thrust of organizational economics is to sidested coordination type problems. 
The function of contracts, governance structures, and mechanisms such as reputation is to 
influence incentives in such a way that agents choose those strategies that result in the choice of 
an equilibrium that is Pareto-superior relative to the Nash equilibrium. By placing the whole 
explanatory emphasis on problems of aligning incentives, it is arguable that many coordination 
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problems of organizational governance are placed outside of the explanatory orbit of 
organizational economics (Camerer and Knez, 1996; Langlois and Foss, 1999; Grandori, 2001).  
Mode of explanation.  Efficient economic organization is supposed to be consciously 
chosen by well-informed, rational agents. Alternatively, evolutionary arguments are invoked, so 
that selection processes sort between organizational forms in favour of the efficient ones 
(Williamson 1985). Thus, explanation is either fully “intentional” or “functional-evolutionary” 
(Elster 1983; Dow 1987). For example, one may compare Nash equilibria that result from 
different distributions of bargaining power (for example, as given by ownership patterns) (Hart 
1995). The link to observed economic organization is established by asserting that what is 
observed is also efficient, for example, because of the existence of effective selection forces 
rapidly performing a sorting among firms with different efficiencies. Alternatively, it is 
established by claiming because agents are supposed to be so clever that they can always 
calculate and choose optimal economic organization.7  
A CLOSER LOOK AT RATIONAL-CHOICE APPROACHES TO  
ORGANIZATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
To speak of a “rational-choice” approach to organizational governance here is, in a sense, a 
reconstruction since it was only from the beginning of the 1980s that social scientists explicitly 
began to speak of a rational-choice approach at all. While economists began from rational-
choice foundations much earlier, they have seldom or never not felt the need to stress the 
obvious. Thus, the relevant economics approaches are not usually talked about as “rational-
choice approaches to organization” per se, but are applications of economics to organizational 
theory ⎯ called the “economics of organization,” the “theory of the firm,” or “organizational 
economics.” While the preceding section identified some of the main methodological and 
substantive themes running through this current, the present section takes a more detailed view, 
organized chronologically and around key contributions.  
                                                 
7  In the words of Hart (1990: 699): “even though the agents are not capable of writing a contract that avoids hold-
up problems, they are clever enough to understand (at least roughly) the consequences of their inability to do so”. 
For a skeptical discussion of this feature, see Kreps (1996).  
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The Firm in Economics: Changing Conceptions 
Although economists have employed the notion of “the theory of the firm” at least since the 
early 1930s (e.g., Robinson, 1932), the meaning of the term has undergone subtle, but important 
changes, and it is only within the last decades that economists have generally recognized the 
need for distinct theorizing relating to the firm. Of course, economists have for a long time 
employed a distinct apparatus relating to the firm’s cost curves, etc. Yet, firms were for a long 
time taken to be unitary actors on par with consumers, the internal organization of the firm 
being treated as essentially a black box. Indeed, the indifference curve/budget constraint 
analysis of basic consumer theory is virtually identical to the isoquant/isocost analysis that is 
used to derive the firm’s cost functions (Boulding, 1942).  
The “theory of the firm” as that term would have been understood by prominent inter-war 
economists, such as Pigou or Viner, is therefore something rather different from the meaning 
that more contemporary theorists, such as Coase, Williamson or Hart, would ascribe to it. This 
reflects the change of the theory of the firm from being concerned with developing a vital 
component of price theory, namely firm behavior, to being concerned with the firm as an 
interesting subject in its own right. At the same time the basic explananda of the theory of the 
firm has changed, from the firm’s pricing decisions, combination of input factors, etc. to the 
questions of why firms exist, and what explains their boundaries and internal organization 
(Holmström and Tirole, 1989). (To capture the latter meaning, reference is in this chapter to 
“organizational economics”). 
That different questions are asked does not mean that organizational economics is developed 
in complete separation from more aggregate issues.  For example, Coase (1992) sees it as an 
integral part of the “institutional structure of production”; Hart (2000) has applies his property 
rights approach to bankruptcy law; Williamson (1987) emphasizes the antitrust implications of 
transaction cost economics; agency approaches (Jensen and Meckling 1976) play an important 
role in the understanding of corporate governance systems; etc. However, it means that the 
modern view of the firm is a significantly less anonymous ideal type (in the sense of Schütz, 
1964) than the firm in economics three or four decades ago, so that analytical attention is 
devoted to the manifold of organizational forms and the different combinations of governance 
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mechanisms that characterize such forms. In addition, attention has been focused on governance 
structures that lie “between” the market and the firm governance structures.  
Coase and Beyond   
Frank Knight, in Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921), was the first economist to explicitly 
argue that economic principles can render intelligible the different forms of business 
organization found in the real world.  However, Knight was primarily interested in explaining 
the existence of profit and the connection between his theory of profits and his theory of the 
firm is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, Knight hints at alternative explanations of the firm and 
internal organization, explanations involving morally hazardous behavior (Barzel 1987), non-
contractibility of entrepreneurial judgment (Langlois and Csontos 1993; Foss 1993), and (this is 
the best known explanation) the optimal allocation of risk (Kihlström and Laffont 1979). The 
latter theory was in fact a critical point of departure for Coase  in “The Nature of the Firm” 
(1937), the paper that is now conventionally regarded as the founding paper in the theory of the 
firm.  
It is not surprising that this paper has achieved the status of a true classic: It succeeds in 
defining a clear program for research in organizational economics, define the key questions and 
provide answers to the question that all revolve around a new analytical category, namely that of 
transaction costs. Coase clearly argues for the explanatory centrality of incomplete contracts and 
transaction costs (“the costs of using the price mechanism”), and puts forward a basic 
contractual conceptualization of the firm and an efficiency approach to its explanation. Most 
importantly, he defines the main desiderata of a theory of the firm, namely to “discover why a 
firm emerges at all in a specialized exchange economy” (i.e. the existence of the firm), to “study 
the forces which determine the size of the firm” (i.e., the boundaries of the firm) and to inquire 
into, for example, “diminishing returns to management” (i.e., the internal organization of the 
firm.  All this, Coase explains, can be reached by adding the category of “costs of using the 
price mechanism” to ordinary economics.  
In following the program thus sketched, and certainly also in addressing the puzzles that 
Coase had left  ⎯ notably the nature of the determinants of “the costs of using the price 
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mechanism” ⎯, most organizational economics is fundamentally Coasian.8 For various reasons, 
some of them explained above, Coase’s seminal analysis was neglected for more than three 
decades in the sense that although its existence was known and acknowledged, it was not used 
(Coase 1972).9 For a long time, it did not give rise to a cumulative theory development. 
However, a few relevant papers did appear in these Dark Ages for organizational economics, 
notably Simon (1951). Simon formalizes Coase’s analysis, and explains the employment 
contract as an incomplete contract where the employer offers a wage in return for which the 
employee agrees to accept the directions of the employer. The contract is incomplete in the 
sense that the two parties are unable to write an enforceable contingent contract that fully 
specifies what the employee must do as a function of the state of the world. The employee will 
accept such an open-ended contract to the extent that he expects the directions that he will 
receive to lie within his “zone of acceptance.”  
Analytical Advances as Driving Organizational Economics  
Apart from isolated contributions there was essentially no development of organizational 
economics until well into the nineteen-seventies. Of course, important work on organizations by 
economists was done, notably the managerial (Baumol, 1962; Williamson, 1963) and 
behavioural (Cyert and March, 1963) theories of the firm. While it is possible to see 
anticipations of organizational economics in these contributions (e.g., the managerial theory 
highlighted incentive-conflicts between firm owners and managers while the behavioural theory 
focused on incentive conflicts between intra-firm agents) none of these were taken up with 
addressing the fundamental desiderata of a theory of the firm as defined by Coase, that is, the 
explanation of the existence and scope of firms.  
                                                 
8  However, when reading Coase’s paper today, one is struck by the absence of references to incentive conflicts, 
arguably the main explanatory focus of today’s economics of organization. Rather, Coase’s perspective emphasizes 
flexibility: in an uncertain world, there is a need for adaptation to more or less unanticipated events, and the 
employment relation, where “... the factor, for a certain remuneration ... agrees to obey the directions of an 
entrepreneur within certain limits” (Coase 1937:  391; emph. in original), may meet that need. The obvious problem 
with this explanation is, of course, that a standard argument in favor of the market has to do with the market’s 
superior adaptability/flexibility (Hayek 1945).  Coase’s analysis does not allow us to say when the firm can beat the 
market in terms of flexibility and vice versa. 
9 It is somewhat questionable how well it really was known.  For example, Marschak (1965) in his overview 
contribution to The Handbook of Organizations on “Economic Theories of Organization” does not even mention 
Coase.  
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In Williamson’s terms (1985), Coase’s analysis awaited its “operationalization” for many 
decades. Coase (1937) had listed several sources of the “costs of using the price mechanism” 
that give rise to the institution of the firm. In part, these are the costs of negotiating and writing 
contracts. The “most obvious cost of ‘organising’ production through the price mechanism is 
that of discovering what the relevant prices are” (Coase 1937). A second type of cost is that of 
executing separate contracts for each of the many market transactions that would be necessary to 
coordinate some complex production activity. However, Coase had given little further details on 
transaction costs and their determinants. Coase’s 1960 paper was more explicit on these issues, 
and although it was not a paper about economic organization per se, it is quite arguable that the 
1960 paper put more analytical flesh on the explanatory skeleton of the 1937 paper. As Barzel 
and Kochin (1992: 25) argue:  
In “The Problem of Social Cost” it is shown that when the cost of transacting is 
positive, rights are not perfectly well defined, and the Coase Theorem makes it 
clear that costly transacting must lower the attainable output. Thus, “The 
Problem of Social Cost,” in pointing out a relationship between the output that 
can be attained from a given set of inputs and the form of organization governing 
these inputs, provides an elaboration useful in the study of the firm.   
These links were probably first explicated in Alchian and Demsetz (1972), the first contribution 
to organizational economics that is explicitly based on the economics of property rights (and 
which, ironically, is strongly critical of Coase, 1937).  
Microeconomists were at work either as applied price theorists, notably in the Chicago and 
UCLA traditions, or as mathematical economists who were preoccupied with refining the 
Walrasian model (incorporating public goods, refining the understanding of uncertainty, trying 
to find room for a medium of exchange, etc.) (Bowles, 2004). However, these two rather 
different occupations of the micro-economist gave important impetus to the construction of the 
expanding toolbox that assisted the takeoff of organizational economics in the mid-nineteen 
seventies. So did other theoretical developments throughout in the nineteen-fifties and nineteen-
sixties. The contributions took place on somewhat different levels. Some were purely analytical 
in the sense of furthering, for example, the conceptualization of uncertainty in the Walrasian 
model (e.g., Radner, 1968), while others were of a more basic, almost methodological nature, 
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such as the growing appreciation of the notion that there are imperfect institutional and 
contractual alternatives for governing transactions and activities (Coase, 1960, 1964; Demsetz, 
1969), and that transaction costs play a key role in understanding the relevant imperfections. 
Among these, partly overlapping, developments are, first, three partly overlapping developments 
that are all associated with the name of Kenneth Arrow:  
Social choice theory and related work. Arrow’s (1951) doctoral dissertation is one of the 
first and most celebrated attempts by rational-choice scholars to seriously grapple with issues of 
non-market decision making. Among the many implications of Arrow’s work is the, albeit 
highly abstract, rationale it provided for phenomena such as leadership and hierarchical 
governance (e.g., as means to eliminate Condorcet cycles) (see Hammond and Miller, 1985). 
Work by Anthony Downs (1957, 1967) also examined non-market, democratic decision making, 
looked into the economic nature of hierarchies, and became hugely influential with respect to 
advancing rational-choice approaches in political science. Public choice theory, founded by 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), looked into constitutional issues on the basis of a 
contractarian approach that became a paradigm mode of explanation in organizational 
economics (Bowles and Gintis, 1988). All these currents legitimized a concern with non-market 
decision making by demonstrating the explanatory power of rational-choice theory in this 
context.  
Work on welfare economics and information economics. Arrow was also a pioneer in the 
introduction of asymmetric and imperfect knowledge ⎯ although key advances had been made 
earlier, notably by Hayek (1945) ⎯ for the understanding of the functioning and welfare 
properties of markets, such as insurance markets (e.g., 1969, 1971). Early work highlighted the 
problem of moral hazard (Arrow, 1962). By employing a counterfactual style of reasoning 
Akerlof’s (1970) study of lemons markets became central to subsequent work in the following 
decades that explicated how institutions and contracts emerge to handle problems associated 
with asymmetric information. An overall implication of his work was that firms can be 
understood as responses to market failures that arise under conditions of externalities and 
information asymmetries. 
Bringing the Walrasian model closer to reality. Very related developments in took place in 
design and planning oriented work that aimed at applying the Walrasian model (Debreu, 1959) 
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to issues of large scale planning and problems of taxation that involved eliciting information 
from agents. By making states of nature unobservable to some agents (moral hazard) or to the 
auctioneer (adverse selection) (Guesnerie 1992), this research stream succeeded not only in 
relaxing the Walrasian model; it also furnished tools that could be transferred from an economy-
wide context and be successful applied to the study of certain classes of small numbers 
interaction (e.g., between a principal and an agent)  
A parallel, but less formal set of developments that may be associated with Coase, are the 
following two strongly overlapping (cf. Barzel and Kochin, 1992) ones:  
Property rights economics and law and economics. A key insight of Coase (1960) was the 
argument that exchanges are exchanges over property rights rather than over goods and services. 
At roughly the same time Alchian (1958) developed the same insight. This idea gave rise to a 
spate of influential work in the 1960s under the heading of “property rights economics” (as 
briefly summarized earlier in this chapter), a stream of research that strongly stressed its 
applicability beyond the market institution (e.g., Alchian, 1965).  The file of law and economics 
also emerged essentially from Coase’s paper and from oral tradition at the University of 
Chicago Law School, which stressed the possible efficiency properties of “non-standard” 
contracting practices. These fields promoted a comparative institutionalist approach (Demsetz 
1969), provided the first working definitions of transaction costs as the costs of defining, 
exchanging and protecting property rights, made a link to relevant fields of law (notably 
contract law), and championed a basic efficiency approach, according to which observed 
economic organization should, at least as a first approximation, be seen as least cost responses 
to exchange problems.    
Chicago-UCLA work in industrial organization.  This kind of work rejected technological 
and monopoly explanations of observed contracting practice, and adopted a comparative 
contracting, and proto-transaction cost, approach (e.g., Director and Levi 1956). Williamson 
(1985: 19) argues that as a result of this kind of work, economists began, in the ten years 
between the celebrated Schwinn (1967) and GTE-Sylvania (1977) cases, to incorporate 
transaction cost considerations into their understanding of vertical restrictions.  
In sum, organizational economics may seen as part of and growing out of a broader (if 
hardly concerted) attempt to move beyond the confines of the market institution and also inquire 
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into the rationales and functioning of alternative institutions for resource allocation (see also 
Arrow 1987; Furubotn and Richter 1997; Salanië 1997; Bowles, 2004), parts of which are often 
summarized under the heading of “the new institutional economics.” 1011 The fact that the above 
developments to a large extent took off independently and continued for a long time to develop 
independently helps explaining the presence of different streams of research in the modern 
theory of the firm.  For example, “nexus of contract theory” is largely an outgrowth of the 
nineteen-sixties’ (almost exclusively verbal) work in property rights economics, whereas 
“formal agency work” is largely an outgrowth of often highly mathematical work that aimed at 
making the Arrow-Debreu model more realistic.  However, the two bodies of theories are 
concerned with rather overlapping themes; what is different is perhaps most of all the style of 
theorizing.  
On the basis of the above influences and developments, work began to blossom within the 
theory of the firm in the mid-nineteen-seventies.  As already mentioned, as late as 1972 Coase 
lamented that his 1937 paper had been “much cited and little used”. However, at the time of 
Coase’s lamentation, serious work on the theory of firm had begun to take off, notably with 
Williamson (1971) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972). These two seminal contributions already 
marked the beginning of a branching in the Coasian theory of the firm, for in retrospect it is 
                                                 
10 A certain, limited interaction with neighbouring disciplines has also played a role for the development of the 
theory of the firm. Thus, Oliver Williamson’s interaction at Carnegie-Mellon University with the likes of Herbert 
Simon, Richard Cyert and James March as well as his reading of Alfred Chandler’s (1962) accounts of American 
business history did play a role for the development of the transaction cost economics approach (Williamson 
1996b). Still, it is surely debatable how deep the impact on the theory of the firm of insights from fields such as 
psychology, sociology, business history and business administration have really been. The overwhelming tendency 
has been to show how economics may give alternative accounts of organizational phenomena, or, in the case of 
business history, take un-theorized insights as grist for the organizational economics mill.  Some economists have 
made more explicit attempts to develop an interdisciplinary approach to organization. Williamson is the most 
obvious example. Thus, Williamson has actively sought to incorporate what he considers to be crucial insights of 
not only psychology and business history, but also law (e.g., Williamson 1979). However, Williamson’s subtle use 
of the work of legal scholars such as Ian Macneil is hardly reflected in other parts of the theory of the firm, or, if 
they are, they are blackboxed under the heading of “costly verifiability.”  
11 The increased division of labour in economics has also played a role for the emergence of the theory of the firm, 
not only in the sense that its emergence is in itself an instance of specialization, but also because of the parallel 
emergence of neighbouring fields, such as labour economics, corporate governance, corporate finance, and public 
choice theory with which the theory of the firm has had interaction and from which inspiration has been gained. 
Relatedly, since at least the beginning of the 1970s economists have become more interested in “micro” issues 
more generally, rather than the more holistic or aggregate concepts that had dominated some fields. 
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evident that they helped found distinct perspectives.12 Other approaches also took off in the 
beginning of the nineteen-seventies, primarily the team-theoretic approach of Marschak and 
Radner (1972) and the evolutionary theory of the firm (Nelson and Winterm 1974).  What has 
more recently become known as “contract theory” also began approximately in the beginning of 
the nineteen-seventies with the first contributions to formal principal-agent theory (Ross 1973). 
The result was what Demsetz (1997) has called a “quiet revolution” in economics.  
Research Streams in Organizational Economics 
The emphasis so far has been on what unites those research streams that cultivate a rational-
choice approach to organizational governance. It is now time to look more closely at the 
differences between these streams. On closer inspection, rather marked differences appear, for 
example, with respect to something so fundamental as how transaction costs should be 
conceptualized and explained and what are their consequences. For example, one stream 
highlights contractual incompleteness, where this may be explained by pointing to the ink costs 
of drafting long complex contracts. Another stream highlights the costs of measuring 
productivity. A related distinction has to do with whether one begins from complete contracts, 
that is, contracts that have all relevant decisions depending on verifiable variables, or not (see 
Tirole, 1999).  
One may broadly interpret this diversion in the literature as stemming from different 
departures from the Arrow-Debreu model. Since firms cannot exist in this model, it is necessary 
to break with one or more of the Arrow-Debreu assumptions, particularly those relating to 
contracting. Two important assumptions in the Arrow-Debreu model are 1) the assumption of 
complete contracting (agents can foresee all future contingencies and costlessly write contracts 
covering all contingencies, so that there are no incomplete contracts), and, 2) the assumption of 
symmetry of information concerning “states of nature” (so that there are no principal-agent 
incentive problems of either the moral hazard or adverse selection variety). 
Incomplete contracting theories break with assumption 1), that is, they are founded on the 
assumption that it is for some or another reason costly to draft complex contracts, and that there 
                                                 
12 For example, when Hart (1989) introduces a distinction between “transaction cost economics” and “the firm as a 
nexus of contracts view”, he is referring to traditions that were largely founded by the Williamson and the Alchian 
and Demsetz papers, respectively.    
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is therefore a need for ex post governance.  In particular, Williamson has for a long time put 
much emphasis on contractual incompleteness, and Grossman and Hart (1986) made the 
incomplete contracting methodology fashionable among formal economists of organization.The 
earlier game theoretical example highlighted the basic mechanics of incomplete contracting 
theories. Complete contracting theories break with assumption 2).  Thus, they allow agents to 
write elaborate contracts characterized by ex ante incentive alignment, but only under the 
constraints imposed by the presence of asymmetric information and (divergent) risk preferences. 
Thus, although the contracts are complete, they are still different from Walrasian contracts 
(which may be called “perfect”).   
The following sections discuss in greater detail the contents of various streams within 
organizational economics, namely the nexus of contracts stream, formal principal-agent work, 
incomplete contracts: the coordination view, and incomplete contracts: the asset 
specificy/property rights view.13 Table 1 below provides an overview of the specific streams of 
research that may serve as a point of reference for the following.  
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Figure 1 Here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
The Nexus-of-Contracts View 
The “nexus-of-contracts view” (Hart, 1989), aka the “measurement branch of transaction 
cost economics” (Williamson, 1985) derives its name from a passage in one of the best known 
contributions to this stream, namely Jensen and Meckling (1976: 311):  
The private enterprise or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as 
a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by divisible 
                                                 
13 Admittedly, this clustering is in some cases relatively imprecise.  For example, there are rather deep-seated 
differences between the work of Oliver Hart and that of Oliver Williamson (who are both put in the incomplete 
contracts: the asset specificy/property rights branch), not the least with respect to how rationality should be 
modelled, and they are therefore only reluctantly grouped together. And some principal-agent work may be argued 
to be merely formalizations of earlier verbal insights. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the present 
clustering is the best possible. For example, in the case of Hart and Williamson, they share one overriding concern 
that sets them apart from other streams of research: the centrality in their stories of specific assets. 
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residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can 
generally be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals. 
 Similar reasoning can be found Alchian and Demsetz (1972), in Fama (1980), and, perhaps most 
forcefully, in Cheung (1983); indeed, Cheung goes as far as doubting whether it is at all 
productive to use the very notion of “the firm”. Much more is at stake here than a 
methodological individualist scepticism of working with aggregate social entities. The 
theoretical point is that it is misleading to draw a hard line between firms and markets (a key 
point in Coase, 1937). Firms are legal entities, and this has important economic implications 
(e.g., limited liability, the right to deduct input purchases from tax statements, infinite lifetime, 
etc.), but they are nevertheless best seen as merely special kinds of market contracting. What 
may distinguish them relative to other market contracts lies primarily in the continuity of 
association among input owners (see also Demsetz, 1988). We may perhaps talk about a nexus 
of contracts being more “firm-like” when, for example, residual claimancy becomes more 
concentrated, but it is not in general productive to talk about “firms” as distinctive entities. 
As Alchian and Demsetz (1972) explicitly argue, a consequence of this view is that the 
distinction between the authority-based and the price-based modes of allocation, so strongly 
emphasized by Coase (1937), is superficial.  In reality, they argue in a famous passage, there is 
no basic difference between “firing” one’s grocer and firing one’s secretary, and what looks like 
a long, open-ended employment contract is in reality a cover for a continuous process of implicit 
negotiation between employers and employees. In an early formulation of the agency problem, 
Alchian and Demsetz argue that what is peculiar about the firm relative to other instances of 
market contracting is “team production” (i.e., production with inseparable individual production 
functions). This technology implies that marginal products are costly to measure, which creates 
a free rider problem, as team-production can be a cover for shirking. The solution to this 
problem is to appoint a monitor who is given the right to fire and hire members of the team, 
based on his observation of employees’ marginal productivities. Giving him rights to the 
residual income of the team furthermore means that he is given incentives to perform the 
efficient amount of monitoring.  This arrangement results in a specific form of organizational 
governance, namely the distribution of rights known as “the classical capitalist firm”.  Thus, the 
firm is explained in terms of the reduction of post-contractual measurement cost.   
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As has been pointed out many times since the publication of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), 
their view raises problems: The monitor need not be the same person as the employer, but may 
an employee of a firm, specialized in monitoring services (Holmström and Tirole 1989).  Is it 
really meaningless to speak of authority if the employer/monitor has the right to deprive the 
employee of the right to work with his tools and equipment to which the employee may be 
specialized (Hart, 1989). More firms seem to be observed than can be explained by team-
production (e.g., conglomerates). While firms indeed consist of collections of contracts, intra-
firm contracts may be qualitatively different from inter-firm contracts; for example, courts will 
rarely intervene in intra-firm disputes, leaving the firm‘s managers as the ultimate authorities for 
resolving disputes (Williamson, 1996a). Still, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) is a seminal 
contribution that is still heavily cited and continues to inspire work.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) which may have been even more influential than Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972), is in many ways an extension of the Alchian and Demsetz’ reasoning to more 
fully include the agency problem between owners and managers.  However, a crucial difference 
is that Jensen and Meckling do not think of team-production as essential to explaining the 
corporation. Instead, organizational governance is structured so as to minimize all sorts of 
agency costs, which they define as 1) the costs of monitoring, 2) bonding costs (i.e., credible 
commitments), and 3) the residual loss (evaluated relative to the actions that would maximize 
the principal’s welfare). Using this definition, Jensen and Meckling focus on the agency costs of 
outside equity and debt, and define optimal capital structure as the combination of debt and 
equity that minimizes agency costs.14 Thus, much of the nexus of contracts stream has consisted 
of critical departures from Alchian and Demsetz.15 However, their paper also inspired formal 
work. An important example is Holmström (1982), itself something of a recent classic.  In 
                                                 
14 Important subsequent work in this stream include Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) are both essentially 
critiques and extensions of the Jensen and Meckling paper, Fama highlighting the role of the managerial labor 
markets in disciplining firm management, Fama and Jensen further elaborating on the division of labour between 
decision management and decision control (see also refs.). 
15 Jensen and Meckling (1992) is testimony that the nexus of contracts research tradition has at least until recent 
been vital. They more explicitly bring in the notion of decision rights − which may have been comparatively 
neglected relative to the notion of residual claimancy in this stream of literature − and combines it with a 
perspective on local knowledge that is derived from Hayek (1945). Like markets, firms are repositories of local 
knowledge and a key organizational design problem is getting right the allocation of decision rights which 
translates into finding the optimal trade-off between losses from agency problems and benefits from a fuller use of 
local knowledge. 
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contrast to Alchian and Demsetz, who focuses on input monitoring as the solution to the team 
problem, Holmström’s focus is on how to provide (monetary) incentives to solve the team 
problem.  Holmström famously demonstrates that in a team-production situation with 
unobservable effort levels, three rather basic requirements that one can sensibly ask of the 
incentive system cannot be met. These are Nash equilibrium, budget balancing (that is, the 
revenues should be fully distributed among the team-members by the incentive system) and 
Pareto optimality. Specifically, a budget-balancing incentive system cannot reconcile Nash 
equilibrium and Pareto optimality. The reason? The fact that every team-member equalizes 
marginal costs and benefits of additional effort, which implies that if one team member’s effort 
generates some extra revenue for the team, he should be given that revenue in order to be 
properly motivated; however, under the requirement of budget balancing this obviously cannot 
be done for all team-members.  In this perspective, the central advantage of the firm is that third 
parties (other units, shareholders) can be made sinks so that the team does not not have to 
balance its budget.   
Historically, both nexus of contracts theory and principal-agent theories (or simply, agency 
theory) are often argued to reach back to early debates on the shareholders/managers relation. 
Following the observation by Berle and Means (1932) that ownership of US firms allegedly had 
become separated from management and control, managerialist theories modeled firm behavior 
as the maximization of managerial objectives (firm size, growth, sales maximization) under a 
profit constraint (Williamson 1964).  The story that was told to explain this was that managerial 
objectives were positively correlated with managerial compensation and power. The attendant 
conflict of interest is, of course, an example of a principal-agent conflict. Indeed, work on this 
conflict forms the theoretical backbone of most of the heavily expanding field of corporate 
governance.  
Formal Agency Theory 
Formal work on agency theory takes off at about the same time as the nexus of contracts 
approach, but only fully picks up steam in the nineteen-eighties with all sorts of extensions of 
the basic model, such as layers of principal-agent relations, multiple agents, agents that carry out 
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multiple tasks, agents that can collude, long term PA setting and much else.16 Indeed, in the 
1980s, principal-agent models became virtually synonymous with “contract theory.”17 The 
canonical agency models are formal representations of the situation in which an informed party 
trades with an uninformed party, and where the private information in question may either 
concern what the agent does (“hidden actions”) or who he is (“hidden characteristics”). Models 
are conventionally classified according to the timing of the moves in the corresponding games 
(i.e., if the informed or the uninformed party moves first) (Salanié, 1997; Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002): There is a distinction between adverse selection models (where the 
uninformed party is imperfectly informed of the characteristics of the informed party); 
signalling models, which have the same informational structure but in which the informed 
moves first; and moral hazard models, in which the uninformed party moves first but is 
imperfectly informed of the actions of the informed party (ibid.: 4).  
The agency problem in its moral hazard manifestation basically stems from a conflict 
between insurance and incentives. The theory of optimal insurance demonstrates that sharing 
profit between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent (i.e, standard assumptions about 
risk preferences in the agency literature) has the risk-neutral principal bearing all of the risk.  
This leads to the first-best outcome.  However, this is only if incentive issues are set aside (or 
the agent has no choice of action).  In the standard bilateral setting, the principal in fact cannot 
propose a first-best contract to the agent because the agent’s action is assumed not to be 
verifiable; hence, cannot be written into the contract. The asymmetric information in question 
may be a matter of either hidden action or hidden knowledge (i.e., the principal does not know 
some characteristics of the agent that are relevant to the relation). The (moral hazard) problem 
then is that the agent selects an action which has random consequences, and those consequences 
are verifiable, but the action and the state of nature (that both “produced” the consequences) are 
not.  In this case, risk-sharing and incentive considerations will interact. The contract will 
specify a reward schedule so that the agent is paid by the principal as a function of the verifiable 
consequences. In general, such a contract will only be second-best. This basic analysis is set out 
already in Ross (1973).   
                                                 
16 See Hart and Holmström (1987) for an early survey and Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a more recent and very 
comprehensive treatment. 
17 At least until Grossman and Hart [1986] defined a new stream within contract theory, namely the “new” property 
rights perspective.   
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Holmström (1979) is arguably the next truly major contribution to formal agency theory. 
The starting point for the analysis is the idea that when only pay-offs/outcomes can be observed, 
optimal contracts will be second-best because of the problem of moral hazard. However, 
creating additional information systems (such as accounting) or in other ways extracting extra 
information about the agent’s actions or states of nature, it is possible to improve on contracts, 
even though the additional information may be imperfect.  Holmström derives a necessary and 
sufficient condition for additional information to be valuable. This is a clearly an important step 
towards an economic approach to such important phenomena as accounting systems or 
management information systems, and Holmström’s work has been of substantial inspiration for 
scholars who adopt formal, rational-choice approaches to understanding such aspects of 
organizational governance (e.g., Antle and Demski, 1988).  
In general, principal-agent theory has brought a wealth of insights that are helpful for 
understanding contractual arrangements in general and important dimensions of organizational 
governance in particular.  Agency models highlight the tradeoff between providing high-
powered incentives (to encourage agent effort) and insuring risk-averse agents against events 
beyond their control (making it easier to attract and retain agents).  Most of the applied literature 
in corporate finance and corporate governance (executive compensation, the structure of debt 
agreements, board composition, and so on) is based on agency theory.   Holmström’s (1979) 
“informativeness principle” suggests that principals should use all performance indicators that 
are available at low cost, to provide a more precise estimate of the agent’s (unobservable) effort; 
this explains why executive compensation agreements tie compensation to multiple measures of 
performance such as accounting returns, stock performance, sales growth, market share, and the 
like. Holmström and Milgrom (1991, 1994) explore multi-task principal-agent models that 
show, as noted above, that pay-for-performance schemes based on objective performance 
metrics can induce a distortion of effort if some tasks are more easily observable than others.  
Under these circumstances, subjective performance measures may be valuable when used in 
conjunction with objective metrics (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994).  
Contrary to common perception (e.g., Ghoshal and Moran, 1996), agency theory does not 
recommend that incentives in organization be made as powerful as possible. In a striking piece 
of work, Holmström and Milgrom (1991) wonder why payment schedules are usually simpler 
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and less high-powered (even when good output measures are seemingly available) than basic 
agency theory would predict. The answer involves the idea that employees often work on multi-
dimensional tasks. In this situation, incentive pay not only influences efforts and allocates risk; 
it also allocates the effort of agents across tasks.  Some possibly essential tasks (or dimensions 
of a task) may be very costly to measure for the principal; as a result, the principal risks that the 
agent will allocate all his effort to tasks (dimensions of a task) that are easier to measure. If 
principals want agents to allocate effort to all tasks (dimensions of a task), they may be better 
off offering a fixed wage, that is, low-powered incentives (see also Gibbons [2005] for more 
detail). This also provides insights into job-design and task assignment, that is, issues of 
organizational specialization and roles: Tasks that are easily measurable may be bundled and 
assigned to certain kinds of jobs whereas costly-to-measure tasks are assigned to other jobs. 
Hard-powered incentives can be provided for the first kind of jobs but not the last kind.  
Although agency theory in important ways further the understanding of organizational, 
agency theory is not a theory of the firm per se (Hart, 1989). The reward schedules that may 
modify the effects of asymmetric information are independent of any particular organizational 
structure.  In principle, a reward schedule for a legally independent supplier firm may be 
completely identical to an employee reward schedule. Thus, principal-agent essentially does not 
discriminate between inter-firm and intra-firm transactions, whereas the main point of Coase is 
exactly that there is a fundamental difference.   
 Incomplete Contracts: The Coordination Perspective 
Differences go farther, for it is notable that Coase (1937) did not emphasize, or even 
mention, incentive conflicts as a part of the understanding of organizational governance.18 
Coase’s (1937) explanation of organizational governance is probably best understood as a 
coordination theory: The firm is an institution that lowers the costs of coordination in a world of 
uncertainty (see further Langlois and Foss 1999). Of course, this view is closely tied to the view 
of the employment contract as the defining characteristic of the firm.  As Simon (1951) points 
out an employee is distinguished from an independent contractor by the nature of his contract: 
While the employee is subject to the authority of the manager of the firm, an independent 
                                                 
18 In his assessment of modern organizational economics, Coase is explicitly critical of the overriding contemporary 
emphasis on incentive conflicts (Coase, 1991a). 
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contractor acts autonomously. Simon (1951) compares the employment contract and the market 
contract thus understood in terms of efficiency.  Whereas the market contract specifies the 
action to be performed in the future and its price, the employment contract specifies a range of 
acceptable orders and establishes the right of the employer and the duty of the employee to 
accept orders within this range (“the zone of acceptance”). As in Coase, the advantage of the 
employment relationship lies in its flexibility (see also Wernerfelt, 1997). The action of the 
employee can be adapted to whatever state of nature will occur. Simon also points out that the 
employment relationship is to some extent reliant upon the employer’s reputation for not 
abusing his authority, a theme later pursued by Kreps (1990, 1996). The need for trusting the 
employer is less if the employee is nearly indifferent between different tasks. 
 Incomplete Contracts: Williamson’s TCE and (New) Property Rights Perspectives 
Incomplete contracts theory of the two kinds under scrutiny here ⎯ the approach associated 
with Oliver Williamson and the one associated with Oliver Hart ⎯ are united in their focus on 
the organizational implications of ex post opportunistic behavior in the presence of relation-
specific investment. There are, however, a number of differences that warrants a separate 
treatment (see also Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Whinston, 2001; Williamson, 2000; Lafontaine 
and Slade, 2007).  
Williamson. In a string of influential contributions, Williamson (e.g., 1971, 1975, 1985, 
1996a) has built a theory that while built on Coasian foundations also incorporate ideas from 
psychology and contract law. The behavioral starting points in Williamson’s theorizing are, 
first, Simon’s concept of bounded rationality, which to Williamson implies the presence of 
contractual incompleteness and a need for adaptive, sequential decision-making.  The second 
crucial behavorial assumption is that opportunism, which is defined as “self-interest seeking 
with guile”.  The implication of opportunism is that contracts will often need various types of 
safeguards, such as “hostages” (e.g., the posting of a bond with the other party).  The unit of 
analysis in Williamson’s work is the multi-dimensional transaction.  In addition to uncertainty 
(which is “frozen”), the dimensions of transactions that are primarily determinative of the costs 
of those transactions are frequency and asset specificity.  In an early contribution, Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian (1978) linked asset specificity to the concept of appropriable quasi-rent:  
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Assume an asset is owned by one individual and rented to another individual. 
The quasi-rent value of the asset is the excess of its value over its salvage value, 
that is, its value in its next best use to another renter. The potentially appropriable 
specialized portion of the quasi rent is that portion, if any, in excess of its value 
to the second highest-valuing user (Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978).  
Following Klein, Crawford and Alchian, asset specificity has increasingly become the 
central character in Williamson’s analysis. Williamson (1996) now identifies six different 
reasons why assets may be costly to redeploy, namely because of specialized knowledge (i.e., 
human capital specificity), attachment to a brand name, a need to take quick actions (“temporal 
specificity”), market size (“dedicated assets”), localization and physical characteristics.  
Specific assets open the door to opportunism.  If contracts are incomplete due to bounded 
rationality, they must be renegotiated as uncertainty unfolds, and if a party to the contract (say, a 
supplier firm) has incurred sunk costs in developing specific assets (including human capital), 
that other party can opportunistically appropriate an undue part of the investment’s pay-off 
(“quasi-rents”) by threatening to withdraw from the relationship. This situation leads to a 
Pareto-inferior outcome, for example, a no-trade outcome. Efficiency dictates the internalization 
within a firm of fransactions that involve highly specific assets. More generally, Williamson 
(1985: 68) argues that variety in contracts and governance structures “… is mainly explained by 
underlying differences in the attributes of transactions.” The general design principle of 
discriminating alignment dictates aligning transactions that differ in the dimensions of 
uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity with governance structures which differ in the 
capacities to handle different transactions (cf. the earlier discussion of governance structures and 
governance mechanisms) in transaction cost discriminating way. Thus, specific constellations of 
(values for) uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity maps directly into specific governance 
structures. This is the main predictive content of Williamsonian transaction cost economics.  
In Williamson’s work (and in contrast to the new property rights view), contractual 
problems are often portrayed as essentially informational: It is defective information that is at 
the root of the inability of independent agents to establish efficient contracting. A Pareto-
improvement may then be brought about vertical integration (Williamson, 1971, 1975). In 
Williamson’s view, the hierarchy possesses certain inherent advantages over market contracting: 
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“... when conflicts develop, the firm possesses a comparatively efficient resolution machinery. 
To illustrate, fiat is frequently a more efficient way to settle minor conflicts (say differences of 
interpretation) than is haggling or litigation (Williamson, 1971: 114).” Although it has been 
present in Williamson’s work from the beginning, this advantage in particular has come to play 
an increasing role in Williamson’s work. Thus, he has placed increasing emphasis on the 
argument organizational governance is characterized by its own implicit contract law, what he 
calls “forbearance”. To illustrate, whereas divisions will not normally be granted standing for a 
court, corporate headquarters and headquarters function as the firm’s “ultimate court of appeal”.  
For example, Williamson (1991) points out that disputes which arise within the firm, for 
example, between different divisions, may be easier to resolve than disputes arising between 
firms which sometimes require the use of the court-system. Thus, managerial authority partakes 
of an important role as arbitrator in the face of conflicts and disputes over unforeseen 
contingencies; in other words, Williamson’s extension of the Coasian view of authority is to 
analyze it as a “private ordering,” a private legal institution (Williamson, 2002). Part of that 
argument is Williamson’s assertion that there are qualitative and quantitative differences 
between the information structures that are available under market contracting and those that are 
available in the firm, an argument put to work in Williamson’s work on the M-form as an 
internal capital market (Williamson, 1975). These are claims that have disputed by what is often 
referred to as the new property rights theorists of the firm.19 In the words of Grossman and Hart 
(1986: 691):  “... the transaction cost-based argument for integration does not explain how the 
scope for such behaviour changes when one of the self-interested owners become an equally 
self-interested employee of the other owner.” 
Hart: The New Property Rights Approach. This approach is often seen as a formal version 
and development of important elements in Williamson’s work (but for a critique of this 
interpretation, see Kreps, 1996; Williamson, 2000; Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). In fact, the 
founding new property rights paper, namely Grossman and Hart (1986), was explicitly 
motivated by an attempt to model Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson’s ideas 
on asset specificity, using modeling conventions and ideas developed in (complete contracting) 
agency theory (particularly Holmström, 1982). However, the outcome of that attempt was 
                                                 
19 “New” to distinguish these theorists from “older” property rights theorists such as Coase, Alchian, Demsetz, etc.  
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essentially a new theory. This is because Klein, Crawford and Alchian as well as Williamson 
have unforeseen contingencies at the heart of their stories: It is the haggling that arises when 
contracts are pushed outside of their self-enforcing range by unforeseen contingencies that is the 
main problem here. What matters is the ex post action. In contrast, most of the incomplete 
contracting approach assumes that ex post bargaining is efficient and that actions (e.g., with 
respect to investment) are taken immediately after the contract is signed.  Thus, what drives 
these models are misaligned ex ante incentives, particularly with respect to investment in 
vertical buyer-supplier relationships.  
As in Williamson’s work, a central assumption is that real-world contracts must necessarily 
be incomplete in the sense that the allocation of control rights cannot specified for all future 
states of the world (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Ownership is defined as 
the possession of residual rights of control, that is, rights to control the uses of assets under 
contingencies that are not specified in the contract. Thus, control implies the ability to exclude 
other agents from deciding on the use of certain assets, for example, the owner has the right to 
pull out the assets he owns from a relation. Such ownership rights can confer bargaining power, 
and play an important role in the determination of the efficient boundaries of the firm. Thus, 
control rights that according to Hart and his associates determine the boundaries of the firm: A 
firm is defined as a collection of jointly owned assets. 
The basic distinction between an independent contractor and an employee, that is to say, 
between an inter-firm and an intra-firm transaction, turns on who owns the physical assets 
which the agent utilizes in his work. An independent contractor owns his tools etc., while an 
employee does not.  The importance of asset ownership derives from the fact that the 
willingness of an agent to undertake a non-contractible investment (say, exertion of effort or 
investment in human capital) which is specific to the asset depends on who owns the asset.  If 
the agent who undertakes the investment does not own the asset, she may, as in Williamson’s 
work, be subject to a hold-up by the owner. On the other hand, the ability to deprive an agent of 
the piece of capital with which she works (and to which she may be heavily specialized) is what 
provides a room for authority. Efficiency then dictates that the agent who is to make the most 
important (non-contractible) asset-specific investment should own the asset. It is not that 
opportunism can be avoided by internal organization/integration per se. Integration may shift 
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incentives for opportunistic behaviour, but it does not remove such incentives. Given this, one 
should choose the ownership arrangement that via its impact on incentives minimizes the 
consequences of opportunism.  
Transaction cost economics and the new property rights view. Grossman and Hart (1986) 
and Hart and Moore (1990) were recognized immediately as path-breaking contributions to the 
study of incomplete contracting. Indeed, Williamson (1996a: 372-73) argued that TCE had 
progressed from “pre-formal” (i.e., Coase’s work) to “semi-formal” (i.e., Williamson’s own 
work) and “fully formal” (i.e., the new property rights view) stages. However, in a later 
discussion Williamson (2000) finds the new property rights finds it substantially different from 
his own framework in several key respects. For instance, formal incomplete-contracting models 
assume that levels of relationship-specific investments are completely unobservable and non-
contractible; yet ex post bargaining over the division of the surplus is costless.20 Moreover, the 
Grossman-Hart-Moore approach emphasizes the direction of integration; even under integration, 
the firm’s central managers cannot observe or verify subordinates’ ex ante relationship-specific 
investments, so it matters whether integration results from Party A acquiring Party B or vice 
versa. In contrast, Williamson argues that integration should be modeled as a hierarchy in which 
the allocation of decision rights is independent of the process by which integration occurred. 
Finally, bounded rationality has been issue of contention. Thus, whereas Hart (1990) explicitly 
denied the need in organizational economics for a notion of bounded rationality (but see Hart 
and Moore [2007] for a different view), to Williamson contractual incompleteness is clearly 
derived from bounded rationality (rather than from some assumed non-contractability of the use 
of the assets in a relation as in the property rights approach).  To Williamson organization 
structure and information channels influence the boundedness of rationality (Williamson, 1970) 
and may for this reason have implications for value creation 
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) show that ex post adjustments under incomplete contracting can 
be modeled formally as well. In their model, completeness and complexity are chosen 
simultaneously (and inversely); ownership gives the contracting party the right to modify the 
project design ex post.  Under integration, the buyer can specify changes that maximize her 
                                                 
20 In his words: “GHM vaporize ex post maladaptation by their assumptions of common knowledge and costless ex 
post bargaining” (Williamson 2000: 605). 
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benefit ex post, but at the cost of weaker incentive for the seller. The result is a model in which 
internal procurement is an increasing function of complexity 
The incomplete contracting debate. Whereas debate between proponents of transaction cost 
economics and the new property-rights perspective has concerned which elements of the 
theoretical structure that should primarily be stressed (asset or investment specificity, costless or 
costly ex post bargaining, etc.), the property-rights approach has been more fundamentally 
contested concerning its fundamental logic. The point of contention is what may explain ex ante 
misaligned investment incentives. Under complete contracting, agents can 1) perfectly foresee 
contingencies, 2) write contracts, and 3) enforce these. The implication is that in order to dilute 
investment incentives, some transaction costs involving assumptions 1) – 3) must be invoked. 
Thus, some aspects of future trades cannot be foreseen and must be left to future negotiation, 
and/or writing costs mean that writing a complete contract is seldom optimal, and/or the parties’ 
valuations are not verifiable by a court and therefore cannot be contracted over.   
However, what is questioned by Maskin and Tirole (1999) and Tirole (1999) is whether such 
transaction costs constrain the set of feasible contracts relative to the complete contracting 
benchmark. If this is not the case, transaction costs are not sufficient to establish neither the 
possibility of inefficient investment patterns, nor a role for ownership (within the particular set-
ups adopted in contract theory).  According to these critics, the problems stems from the fact 
that although valuations are not verifiable, they may be still be observable by the parties, which 
implies that trade may be conditioned on message games between the parties.  These games are 
designed ex ante in such a way that they can effectively describe ex post all the trades that were 
not described ex ante. The key to this argument is the assumption (which is routinely made in 
the new property-rights literature) that parties allocate property rights and choose investments so 
that their expected utilities are maximized, knowing (at least probabilistically) how payoffs 
relate to allocations of property rights and levels of investment.21  Maskin and Tirole (1999) 
then provide sufficient conditions under which the indescribability of contingencies does not 
restrict the payoffs that can be achieved, a sort of “irrelevance of transaction costs” theorem. As 
Hart and Moore (1999) point out, however, unless the contracts governing these message games 
                                                 
21  In the jargon of the literature, they can perform “dynamic programming,” which essentially is 
intertemporal optimization with discounting in a stochastic setting. 
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are renegotiation-proof – that is, the parties can commit ex ante not to renegotiate ex post if the 
possibility of mutual gain arises – such contracts are not much better than the incomplete 
contracts in the original Grossman-Hart-Moore model (see also Segal, 1999). Moreover, the 
contracts governing these message games can be extremely complex and prohibitively costly 
(Anderlini and Felli, 2004). 
 Extensions  
The critical point, associated with Williamson, that there is little ex post action in formal 
organizational economics implies that most of organizational governance is reduced to issues of 
ex ante incentive alignment and allocation of residual ownership rights. “Softer” but very real 
management and organizational governance issues such as how to cultivate organizational 
citizenship behaviour, avoid breach of psychological contracts and the like, seem difficult to 
press into such an ex ante design-oriented perspective. However, organizational economists 
have made significant strides forward with respect to linking ideas on ownership and incentives 
to such softer issues.  
A starting point is the fact that human capital is inalienable. However, as Rajan and Zingales 
(1998: 388) argue, “... there is a sense in which employees ‘belong’ to an organization ... This 
sense of belonging arises from the expectation ‘good citizens’ of an organization have that they 
will receive a share of future organizational rents”. Starting from the new property rights 
perspective, they treat this kind of belonging in terms of “access”, which means that agents are 
allowed to work with critical resources, specialize themselves relative to these resources and 
make themselves valuable in this way. Since a specialized employee can control her own 
specialized human capital, she now has additional power, although she doesn’t possess more 
residual rights of control. In their theory, access may sometimes provide better incentives than 
ownership. Thus, Rajan and Zingales elegantly manage to incorporate “soft” aspects of 
organizations, such as power and the development of capabilities, into the incomplete contracts 
approach. In general, there are ample opportunities to make room for softer aspects of 
organizational governance in the context of the incomplete contracts approach. When it is 
difficult to write complete state-contingent contracts, for example, when certain variables are 
either ex ante unspecifiable or ex post unverifiable, people often rely on “unwritten codes of 
conduct”, that is, on implicit contracts. These may be self-enforcing, in the sense that each party 
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lives up to the other party’s (reasonable) expectations from a fear of retaliation and breakdown 
of cooperation.  
Such a line of inquiry is pursued in Kreps (1990). Roughly, Kreps argues that employers and 
employees may be seen as playing a prisoners dilemma-game, that with repeated plays a 
cooperative norm − which is interpreted as corporate culture − may be established, and that this 
established norm tells employees (as well as outside contractors) that firm management will not 
opportunistically take advantage of them.  The firm is seen in Kreps’ paper, not as a collection 
of physical assets but rather as a carrier of reputation capital.22   
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) further explore the “relational” aspects of incomplete 
contracting.  As they point out, vertical relations should be characterized not only according to 
ownership (make or buy), but also according to frequency (one-time or recurring).  For repeated 
transactions, the choice is not between “spot outsourcing” and “spot employment,” but between 
“relational outsourcing” and “relational employment.”  Klein and Leffler (1981) noted that 
reputation can substitute for hierarchy in mitigating opportunistic behavior among trading 
partners.  Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) add that asset ownership (in the Grossman-Hart-
Moore sense) affects parties incentives to renege on a relational contract, both outside and inside 
the firm. 
They construct a repeated game in which a downstream party makes a non-contractible 
promise to pay a bonus to an upstream party for delivering high quality.  Integration increases 
the downstream party’s incentive to renege on the promise (under non-integration, if the 
downstream party reneges, the upstream party can sell the good to an alternative user).  Non-
integration, however, increases the upstream party an incentive to increase the value of the 
traded good to the alternative user, giving her a stronger bargaining position should the 
downstream party renege.  The tension between these incentives gives rise to the trade-off 
                                                 
22 A different way of incorporating softer aspects of organizations that also stays close to the spirit of the 
incomplete contracts/new property rights approach is provided by Klein (1988).  However, he argues that rather 
than focusing on individual human or physical assets in the analysis of the boundaries of the firm, attention should 
be directed to what “organization ownership”. An organization can obtain ownership of another organization’s 
organization capital, that is, the firm-specific knowledge embodied in the organization’s team of employees (what 
is sometimes called “capabilities”). This can alleviate the hold-up problem, for the reason that it is (after 
integration) hard for the now integrated team to hold up the acquiring organization. The costs of collective action 
may be prohibitive and the hold-up attempt may be illegal.  
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between integration and non-integration.  The analysis is very much in the spirit of the 
incomplete-contracting approach, but extended to a repeated-game setting.     
Syntheses 
The above treatment of streams in organizational economics should not be taken to imply 
that they are equally important in today’s organizational economics. In fact, the Coasian (in the 
original sense) emphasis on coordination on activities and knowledge rather than incentive 
conflicts is a theme that is pursued by only a few theorists (although very important work has 
emerged from this stream, e.g., Wernerfelt, 1997; Garicano, 2000).  Very little work is being 
done within the nexus of contracts stream. The most viable streams on the contemporary 
organizational economics scene are agency theory, the new property rights approach, and 
empirical transaction cost economics.  Moreover, similarities rather than differences are 
increasingly stressed and explicit syntheses are increasingly being forwarded.  
The perhaps first ambitious attempt to define a synthesis, specifically of agency theory, 
property rights theory and the strong emphasis on authority characteristic of transaction cost 
economics, is Holmström and Milgrom (1994). Striking a Williamsonian chord, they emphasize 
the importance of viewing the firm as “a system”, specifically as a coherent set of 
complementary contractual arrangements which mitigate incentive conflicts. It is misleading, 
they argue, to focus on any one single aspect of this coherent whole: The firm is characterized 
by the employee not owning the assets (a new property rights point), by the employee being 
subject to a low-powered incentive scheme (a multitask agency point), and by the employee 
being subject to the authority of the employer (a transaction cost economics point), and all are 
essential aspects of the same phenomenon. Speficially, these “incentive instruments” are 
complementary: For example, in the presence of measurement costs, it is important that a person 
who does not own the assets which he uses is not subject to high-powered incentives, since he 
then is likely to care too little for the assets. Likewise, low-powered incentives make it 
important for the employer to be able to exercise authority over the use of the employee’s time, 
since otherwise the employee will lack the proper incentive to be productive. Due to this 
complementarity, it is logical that independent contracting has the exact opposite constellation 
of instruments from the employment relationship.  
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Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein (2007) attempt to synthesize key concepts of organizational 
governance with the economic theory of entrepreneurship.  They begin with Knight’s (1921) 
concept of entrepreneurship as judgment.  In Knight’s formulation, entrepreneurship represents 
judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its marginal product and which cannot, 
accordingly, be paid a wage (Knight 1921: 311).  In other words, there is no market for the 
judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and therefore exercising judgment requires the person with 
judgment to start a firm.  Of course, judgmental decision makers can hire consultants, 
forecasters, technical experts, and so on.  However, in doing so they are exercising their own 
entrepreneurial judgment.23  Judgment thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental decision-
making is ultimately decision-making about the employment of resources.  The entrepreneur’s 
role, then, is to arrange or organize the capital goods he owns.  As Lachmann (1956, p. 16) puts 
it: “We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital combinations . . . will be ever 
changing, will be dissolved and reformed. In this activity, we find the real function of the 
entrepreneur.” 
One way to operationalize the notion of resource heterogeneity is to incorporate Barzel’s 
(1997) idea that capital goods are distinguished by their attributes. Attributes are characteristics, 
functions, or possible uses of assets, as perceived by an entrepreneur. Assets are heterogeneous 
to the extent that they have different, and different levels of, valued attributes. Attributes may 
also vary over time, even for a particular asset. Given Knightian uncertainty, entrepreneurs are 
unlikely to know all relevant attributes of all assets when production decisions are made. Nor 
can the future attributes of an asset, as it is used in production, be forecast with certainty. 
Attributes are manifested in production decisions and realized only ex post, after profits and 
losses materialize.24  Entrepreneurs who seek to create or discover new attributes of capital 
assets will want ownership titles to the relevant assets, both for speculative reasons and for 
                                                 
23 In Foss, Foss, and Klein’s (2007) terminology, the entrepreneur-owner exercises “original” judgment, while hired 
employees, to whom the owner delegates particular decision rights, exercise “derived” judgment as agents of the 
owner. 
24 As Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 793) note, “[e]fficient production with heterogeneous resources is a result not 
of having better resources but in knowing more accurately the relative productive performances of those resources.” 
Contra the production function view in basic neoclassical economics, such knowledge is not given, but has to be 
created or discovered. Even in the literature on opportunity creation and exploitation, in which entrepreneurial 
objectives are seen as emerging endogenously from project champions’ creative imaginations, entrepreneurial 
means (resources) are typically taken as given (see, for example, Sarasvathy, 2001). 
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reasons of economizing on transaction costs.  These arguments provide room for 
entrepreneurship that goes beyond deploying a superior combination of capital assets with 
“given” attributes, acquiring the relevant assets, and deploying these to producing for a market: 
Entrepreneurship may also be a matter of experimenting with capital assets in an attempt to 
discover new valued attributes.  
Such experimental activity may take place in the context of trying out new combinations 
through the acquisition of or merger with another firms, or in the form of trying out new 
combinations of assets already under the control of the entrepreneur.  The entrepreneur’s 
success in experimenting with assets in this manner depends not only on his ability to anticipate 
future prices and market conditions, but also on internal and external transaction costs, the 
entrepreneur’s control over the relevant assets, how much of the expected return from 
experimental activity he can hope to appropriate, and so on.  Moreover, these latter factors are 
key determinants of economic organization in modern theories of the firm, which suggests that 
there may be fruitful complementarities between the theory of economic organization and 
Austrian theories of capital heterogeneity and entrepreneurship.  
Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein (2007) show how this approach provides new insights into the 
emergence, boundaries, and internal organization of the firm.  Firms exist not only to economize 
on transaction costs, but also as a means for the exercise of entrepreneurial judgment, and as a 
low-cost mechanism for entrepreneurs to experiment with various combinations of 
heterogeneous capital goods.  Changes in firm boundaries can likewise be understood as the 
result of processes of entrepreneurial experimentation.  And internal organization can be 
interpreted as the means by which the entrepreneur delegates particular decision rights to 
subordinates who exercise a form of “derived” judgment on his behalf (Foss, Foss, and Klein, 
2007).  
APPLICATIONS AND EVIDENCE 
Public Bureaucracies 
Organizational governance, as defined in this chapter, refers primarily to arrangements that 
govern private, profit-seeking enterprises.  While the literature on the organization and 
governance of non-market institutions such as public bureaucracies, non-profit institutions, 
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religious bodies, and the like has evolved largely independently of organizational economics, 
there has been important cross-fertilization between these fields. Much of the modern literature 
in “positive political economy,” for example, takes models developed in the economic analysis 
of organization and applies them to non-market settings (Moe, 1984, 1990; Shepsle and 
Weingast, 1987; North and Weingast, 1989; Weingast, 1997).  Building on the core insights 
from theories of rent-seeking and public choice (Downs, 1965; Tullock, 1967; Niskanen, 1971), 
this literature seeks to explain how political actors craft governance structures, or institutions, to 
facilitate efficient production and exchange of political goods and services.  These studies are 
part of the “rational-choice” tradition in political science, broadly speaking, but focus on 
coalition formation, the role of reputation, formal and informal contracts (i.e., constitutions), and 
similar structures as means of organizational governance. 
Antitrust and Regulation 
Organizational economics, particularly in its transaction-cost incarnation, has obvious 
implications for antitrust, regulation, and other aspects of government policy toward business. 
Indeed, the subtitle of Williamson’s 1975 book Markets and Hierarchies is “Analysis and 
Antitrust Implications,” and significant parts of his work taken issue with what he calls the 
“inhospitality tradition” in antitrust— that is, the notion characteristic of antitrust thinking in the 
1960s in the US and until recently in the European Union that firms engaged in non-standard 
business practices like vertical integration, customer and territorial restrictions, tie-ins, 
franchising, and so on, must be seeking monopoly gains. Of course, Williamson’s argument was 
that many of such non-standard practices in actuality enhanced efficiency by economizing with 
transaction costs. Antitrust practice is now, generally speaking, very lax on vertical 
arrangements (the typical exception being resale price maintenance), and it is quite arguable that 
much of the changed antitrust climate in this regard can be traced to the rather general 
acceptance in the economics profession of transaction cost (and contract theory) arguments 
concerning the efficiency properties of such arrangements.  
As Shelanski and Klein (1995) explain, transaction cost economics in particular, has actual 
or direct implications for other contracting practices and regulations. They invoke Barker and 
Chapman’s (1989) argument that that closed-shop agreements in labor markets may serve to 
protect workers’ job-specific training rather than to exploit a monopoly position. They also point 
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to studies of optimal contract design, notably Crocker and Reynolds’s (1993) examination of Air 
Force procurement contracts as guides to public policy toward government purchases of goods 
and services.  
M&A and Diversification 
Organizational economics also has important implications for mergers, divestitures, and 
restructurings as mechanisms for changing firm boundaries and governance structure, as well as 
implications for diversification and diversification’s impact on firm performance, key issues in 
corporate finance as well as strategic management.  The choice between acquisition and internal 
growth can be modeled as a transaction cost problem, and the vast theoretical and empirical 
literature on the gains from M&A and corporate reorganizations can be viewed as applications 
of the economic approach to organizational governance (mostly, agency theory).  The literature 
on boundaries goes far beyond textbook explanations for economies of scope in production.  As 
Teece (1980, 1982) pointed out, scope economies imply joint production, not integration; absent 
transactional difficulties, two separate firms could simply contract to share the inputs, facilities, 
or whatever accounts for the relevant scope economies. If they do not, it must be because the 
costs of writing or enforcing such a contract are greater than the benefits from joint production.  
Diversification also has little to do with risk reduction, as investors can reduce firm-specific risk 
by holding diversified portfolios, consisting of shares in a variety of single-product firms.25  
Williamson (1975: 155–75) offers an account of the multi-product firm based on intra-firm 
capital allocation. In his theory, diversified firms arise when limits in the capital market permit 
internal management to allocate and manage funds more efficiently than the external capital 
market.  These efficiencies may come from several sources. First, the corporate office typically 
has access to information unavailable to external parties, which it extracts through its own 
internal auditing and reporting procedures (Williamson, 1975, pp. 145–47).  Second, managers 
inside the firm may also be more willing to reveal information to the corporate office than to 
outsiders, since revealing the same information to the capital market would also reveal it to rival 
firms, potentially hurting the firm’s competitive position.  Third, the corporate office can inter-
                                                 
25 Moreover, risk pooling at the firm level should be more costly than risk pooling at the level of the individual 
investor, since the transaction costs of buying or selling stock are presumably lower than the transaction costs of 
adding or liquidating a division (Williamson, 1975, p. 144). Diversification to reduce risk only benefits managers, 
who can reduce their own “employment risk” at the expense of the value of the firm (Amihud and Lev, 1981). 
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vene selectively, making marginal changes to divisional operating procedures, whereas the 
external market can discipline a division only by raising or lowering the share price of the entire 
firm.  Fourth, the corporate office has residual rights of control that providers of outside finance 
do not have, making it easier to redeploy the assets of poorly performing divisions (Gertner, 
Scharfstein, and Stein, 1994).  More generally, these control rights allow headquarters to add 
value by engaging in “winner picking” among competing projects when credit to the firm as a 
whole is constrained (Stein, 1997).  Fifth, the internal capital market may react more 
“rationally” to new information: those who dispense the funds need only take into account their 
own expectations about the returns to a particular investment, and not their expectations about 
other investors’ expectations, eliminating speculative bubbles or waves. 
On the other hand, some writers argue that cross-subsidization is harmful, leading to rent 
seeking by divisional managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), bargaining problems within the 
firm (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000) or bureaucratic rigidity (Shin and Stulz, 1998).   Intra-
firm resource allocation can be “sticky,” and resources may not flow to their highest-valued 
uses. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between diversification and performance is mixed. 
Influential studies by Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and Servaes (1996) found 
that multi-segment firms traded at a discount relative to more specialized firms, or to portfolios 
of nondiversified firms from the diversified firm’s industries.  More recently, however, 
Chevalier (2000), Villalonga (2000), Campa and Kedia (2002), and Graham, Lemmon, and 
Wolf (2002) argue that diversified firms trade at a discount not because diversification destroys 
value, but because undervalued firms tend to diversify. Diversification is endogenous and the 
same factors that cause firms to be undervalued may also cause them to diversify.26 Even the 
conventional wisdom on the 1960s has been challenged, with Matsusaka (1993), Hubbard and 
Palia (1999), and Klein (2001) finding evidence for efficiency gains from some conglomerate 
mergers. 
                                                 
26 There are also important data and measurement problems. Most studies use Tobin’s q to measure divisional 
investment opportunities, but it is marginal q—which may not be closely correlated with observable q—that drives 
investment (Whited, 2001). SIC codes are also typically used to measure diversification and to identify industries, 
but the SIC system contains significant errors (Kahle and Walkling, 1996) and cannot reliably distinguish between 
related and unrelated activities (Teece, Dosi, Rumelt, and Winter, 1994; Lien and Klein, 2005). 
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Evidence 
 There is a large body of empirical literature examining various issues in organizational 
governance.  Besides the work on diversification described above, many empirical studies have 
examined the make-or-buy decision, focusing mainly on the transaction cost approach.  
(Comparatively little empirical work looks at agency theory (excepting corporate finance and 
governance applications), the resource-based view, and the property-rights approach.  The 
empirical TCE literature is surveyed and summarized in Masten (1984), Joskow (1988), 
Shelanski and Klein (1995, 1996), Klein (2005), and Macher and Richman (2006), and the bulk 
of the evidence is interpreted as consistent with the predictions of TCE (see David and Han, 
2004, and Carter and Hodgson, 2006, for a contrary view).  Despite challenges associated with 
the measurement and definition of key variables, the role of asset specificity, comparison with 
rival theories, and causality, the transaction cost model seems to have straightforward empirical 
implications, such that observed forms of organizational governance can be explained in terms 
of asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency, and so on.   
 With the RBV and property-rights approaches, however, the implications for observed 
phenomena are less clear.  Arend (2007) claims that the RBV does not have clear empirical 
implications (see also Newbert, 2007).  Moreover, while the empirical evidence on TCE is often 
interpreted as consistent with the property rights approach as well, there are important 
differences between these two sets of explanations for firm boundaries. Partly because ex post 
contractual problems are easier to observe than ex ante human capital underinvestment—How, 
for instance, is optimal investment to be measured?—there have been relatively few empirical 
studies explicitly in the property-rights tradition.27 Whinston (2000) argues that the empirical 
evidence described above is not necessarily consistent with the property-rights approach. As he 
points out, in property-rights models the level of appropriable quasi-rents is not relevant for the 
integration decision; only marginal quasi-rents matter. Few empirical studies make this 
distinction. Furthermore, property-rights models offer specific predictions on the direction of 
integration (whether buyer acquires seller or seller acquires buyer), a distinction that is also 
generally ignored in the empirical literature. 
                                                 
27 Hart (1995, p. 49) remarks that there has been “no formal testing of the property rights approach.” (By “formal 
testing” he presumably excludes case studies.) 
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CRITIQUES AND DISCUSSION 
Debate on Organizational Economics 
Ever since its take-off period in the mid-nineteen seventies, organizational economics has 
been subject to intense debate.  Much debate has been an internal one between scholars who are 
within or at least stay relatively close to the economic mainstream (e.g., Dow 1987;  Hart 1995; 
Kreps 1996; Furubotn and Richter 1997; Maskin and Tirole 1999; Foss and Foss 2000; 
Furubotn 2002; McLeod 2002). However, there are also many external critiques that is 
represented by from sociologists, heterodox economists of various stripes, and management 
scholars. Williamsonian transaction cost economics in particular has been a favorite 
Prügelknabe for about three decades (Hodgson, 1989; Perrow, 2002), but agency theory has also 
drawn a fair amount of fire (Donaldson, 1996).  Thus, early critics argued that transaction cost 
neglected power relations (Perrow ,1986), as well trust and other forms of social embeddedness 
(Granovetter 1985), and paid too little attention to evolutionary considerations, including 
Knightian uncertainty and market processes (Langlois, 1984). Such critiques have been echoed 
and refined in numerous contributions until this day.  Criticizing organizational economics is 
still a thriving industry, populated by sociologists (Freeland,2002), heterodox economists (e.g., 
Hodgson, 1998; Langlois and Foss 1999; Hodgson, 1998; Loasby, 1999; Witt, 1999; Dosi and 
Marengo, 2000), and, increasingly, management scholars (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton, 2005). Critics have also questioned the 
empirical evidence supporting organizational economics (Hodgson year…). It often seems that 
many of the characteristics that the critics focus in on are not really particular to organizational 
economics, but are characteristic features of contemporary (game-theoretic) microeconomics.28 
However, in the following these characteristics and features are discussed as they apply to 
organizational governance.  
                                                 
28 However, a different interpretation is possible: What (at least some) critics protest is the use of tools that may 
well be appropriate for the analysis of market exchange to analyze firm organization. Thus, while some critics may 
balk at methodological individualism and rational choice methodology in general, they are likely to find such 
assumptions particularly objectionable when they are applied to the theory of the firm. In much of the critical 
literature, firms (particularly three or four decades back) are often portrayed in rosy terms as “mini-societies” 
(Freeland 2002) of “communities” (Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton, 2005) that provide “identity” (Kogut and Zander 
1996), “higher-order organizing principles” (Kogut and Zander 1992), trust relations (Ghoshal and Moran 1996), 
and collective learning (Hodgson 1998) that, purportedly, “atomistic” markets cannot provide.   
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Cognition 
Formal economics typically assumes that agents hold the same, correct model of the world 
and that model does not change. This is also the case of the formal manifestations of 
organizational economics. More precisely, these assumptions are built into formal contract 
theory through the assumption that payoffs, strategies, and the like are common knowledge. 
These assumptions are clearly at variance with the notion of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955), 
and in formal organizational economics bounded rationality is almost entirely neglected (but 
see, e.g., Mookherjee, 1998). In contrast, bounded rationality is often invoked in Williamson’s 
(1985, 1996) less formalized work, but its role here is mainly to explain why contracts are 
incomplete. The reason is presumably that the theory is taken up with comparative institutional 
exercises, focusing on transaction cost economizing, and hence has no room for the process 
aspects introduced by more substantive notions of bounded rationality (e.g., Furubotn 2002).29    
In contrast, bounded rationality has long been a central assumption in organization theory 
(e.g., March and Simon,1958; Cyert and March,1963; Grandori, 2001). In fact, recent critics of 
organizational have drawn explicitly on these older sources to develop alternative, evolutionary 
views emphasizing the role of bounded rationality in problem-solving, and the role of firms as 
cognitive structures around such problem-solving efforts (e.g., Dosi and Marengo, 1994). Other 
critics, also echoing behavioral organization theory, argue that a key characteristic of firms is 
that they tend to shape employee cognition (Kogut and Zander 1996; Hodgson 1998; Witt 
1999). For example, starting with social learning theory, Witt (1999) argues that individual 
cognitive frames are socially shaped and that firms can accomplish such shaping.   
Few economists of organization have reacted to the above critiques, arguably because taking 
these critiques seriously means questioning fundamental tenets of mainstream economic 
modelling; thus, bounded rationality questions, for example, subjective expected utility theory, 
the independence of payoff utilities, the irrelevance of labeling, and common prior beliefs 
(Camerer, 1998). However, a handful of contributions, mainly to contract theory, do try to 
model agents that are boundedly rational in a more substantive sense.  For example, Mookerjee 
                                                 
29 Dow (1987) argues that it is inconsistent to invoke bounded rationality as a necessary assumption in the analysis 
of contracts and governance structures, and then assume that substantively rational choices can be made with 
respect to the contracts and governance structures (that are imperfect because of bounded rationality). See also 
Kreps (1996) for a similar point.  
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(1998) shows how ambiguity may lead to incomplete contracting; Carmichael and McLeod 
(2003) show that if boundedly-rational agents care about sunk costs, this may solve the hold-up 
problem. There are various problems with such approaches. Notably, there may be too many 
“degrees of freedom,” in the sense that virtually any cognitive bias may be thrown into a 
standard contracting model, thus producing a nonstandard result.  Moreover, how does the 
theorist decide which manifestation of bounded rationality to model?  The danger is that one 
ends up with a string of unconnected and extreme partial models with no apparent connection to 
empirical reality.  
Motivation  
In critiques of organizational economics, the notion of opportunism seems to be the favorite 
bête-noire. The critique takes various forms. Thus, some may dismiss the relevance of 
opportunism is dismissed by pointing to the low frequency with which opportunistic action can 
be observed, an argument that  misunderstands the counterfactual nature of reasoning in the 
theory of the firm: Opportunistic behavior is seldom observed because governance structures are 
chosen to mitigate opportunism. According to a more recent argument, the primary problem 
with the treatment of motivation in organizational economics is not opportunism per se, but 
rather that all motivation is of the “extrinsic” type (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Osterloh and 
Frey, 2000).  In other words, all behavior is understood in terms of encouragement from an 
external force, such as the expectance of a monetary reward.  (In contrast, when “intrinsically” 
motivated, individuals wish to undertake a task for its own sake).  Ghoshal and Moran (1996) 
argue that organizational economics misconstrues the causal relation between motivation (e.g., 
the tendency to shirk) and the surrounding environment (the type of governance structure in 
place). “Hierarchical” controls, they state, reduce organizational loyalty and thus increase 
shirking. Williamson’s approach becomes a “self-fulfilling prophecy,” and is therefore “bad for 
practice.” Lindenberg (2003) makes use of psychological notions of framing to develop a subtle 
argument that managers by their actions, whether consciously or unconsciously, send 
behavioural signals to employees that induce specific cognitive frames in the minds. In turn 
such frames influence whether employee motivation lies more towards the extrinsic or the 
intrinsic pole of the motivational spectrum.  
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These arguments do not necessarily deny the reality of opportunism, moral hazard, and so 
on, but assert that there are other, more appropriate ways to handle these problems than 
providing monetary incentives, sanctions, and monitoring. The arguments are often based on 
social psychological research (Deci and Ryan, 1985) and on experimental economics (e.g., Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000). It is characteristic of much of the literature that the social psychology 
research that is cited is very seldom questioned.  However, we believe that the jury is still out on 
such crucial issues as the pervasiveness, seriousness and reality of motivation crowding out 
(Deci and Ryan, 1985).  Still, working, working with alternative motivational assumptions may 
be a fruitful way forward, and arguably one that may be more fruitful than working with 
alternative cognitive assumptions: It seems easier to doctor utility functions than cognitive 
assumptions.Moreover, the implications for economic organization may also seem more 
immediate (see Lazear 1991; Fehr and Gächter 2000 for concrete examples).   
Everything Is Given 
A major problem with modern economic theories of the firm is that they ignore the 
entrepreneur (Furubotn, 2002; Foss and Klein, 2005). Thus, Furubotn (2002: 72-3) points out that 
“profit is always in the background of TCE analysis because it is impossible to say whether a 
particular action (and contractual arrangement) undertaken by the firm is desirable or not purely on 
the basis of the costs of transacting. . . . There is reason, then, to give greater consideration to the 
question of how profits are generated.” And this leads to the theory of entrepreneurship. However, 
in organizational economics reference to entrepreneurship is passing at best.  Still, various attempts 
to put entrepreneurship into organizational economics do exist (e.g., Casson, 1997; Foss and Klein, 
2005). For example, starting from a notion of entrepreneurship as judgmental decision-making 
under conditions of uncertainty that is hard to contract, Foss and Klein (2005) establishes a link to 
asset ownership and the start-up of a firm. In this approach, resource uses are not data, but are 
created as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using assets to produce goods. The entrepreneur’s 
decision problem is aggravated by the fact that capital assets are heterogeneous, and it is not 
immediately obvious how they should be combined. Asset ownership facilitates experimenting 
entrepreneurship: acquiring a bundle of property rights is a low cost means of carrying out 
commercial experimentation. The problem with such ideas is that they lie fundamentally outside 
the standard constrained optimization framework and are inherently difficult to model 
 56
mathematically. Modern economists are reluctant to appreciate ideas that are not expressed in 
the familiar formal language.   
Process Issues 
Many critics have taken issue with the presumed ahistorical, non-processual nature of 
organizational economics. One aspect of this is a neglect of path dependence. According to 
Winter (1991: 192): 
In the evolutionary view—perhaps in contrast to the transaction cost view—the 
size of a large firm at a particular time is not to be understood as the solution to 
some organizational problem.  General Motors does not sit atop the Fortune 500 
… because some set of contemporary cost minimization imperatives 
(technological or organizational) require a certain chunk of the U.S. economy to 
be organized in this manner.  Its position at the top reflects the cumulative effect 
of a long string of happenings stretching back into the past.” 
It is correct that organizational economics has largely neglected how the governance of a 
particular transaction may depend on how previous transactions were governed. However, if 
such path dependence is actually present (what Argyres and Liebeskind [1999] call “governance 
inseparability”), firms may rationally rely on governance structures that appear inefficient at a 
particular time, but which make sense as part of a longer-term process.  Changes in governance 
structure affect not only the transaction in question, but the entire temporal sequence of 
transactions. This may make organizational form appear more “sticky” than it really is. A partial 
response to this is Williamson’s (1996) notion of remediableness. The outcome of a path-
dependent process is suboptimal, he argues, only if it is remediable— that is, an alternative 
outcome can be implemented with net gains. Merely pointing to a hypothetical superior 
outcome, if it not attainable, does not establish suboptimality.  Thus, a governance structure or 
contractual arrangement “for which no superior feasible alternative can be described and 
implemented with expected net gains is presumed to be efficient” (Williamson 1996: 7).  
 A related process issue turns on the explanation of economic organization in terms of 
efficiency that characterizes organizational economics. has been one of the most frequently 
criticized characteristics of the theory of the firm: Assuming that agents can figure out the 
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efficient organizational arrangements seems to collide with the assumption of bounded 
rationality (Dow 1987; Furubotn 2002).  Presumably in response to this problem, early work in 
the theory of the firm often explicitly assumed that market forces work to cause an “efficient 
sort” between transactions and governance structures, an assumption that is not in general 
tenable.  While appealing to market selection, Williamson (1988: 174) also clearly recognizes 
that the process of transaction cost economizing is not automatic.  Still, he maintains that the 
efficiency presumption is reasonable, offering the argument that inefficient governance 
arrangements will tend to be discovered and undone.30 Clearly, this assumption is not an 
innocuous one.  It is in fact a key underlying assumption in virtually all empirical work in the 
theory of the firm.  A general problem with the empirical literature on organizational form is 
that we usually observe only the business arrangements actually chosen.  However, if these 
arrangements are presumed to be efficient, then we can draw inferences about the appropriate 
alignment between transactional characteristics and organizational form simply by observing 
what firms do.   The problem is that the efficiency assumption has always been taken as an 
essential, but untested, background assumption.  
Reflexivity 
Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton (2005; also see Ghoshal, 2006) build from a strong social 
constructionist position to argue that the language and assumptions of social science theories 
strongly affect, or even determine, much of what individuals do, experience, and think. Their 
paper may be seen as a generalization of arguments in Ghoshal and Moran (1996), and like 
these writers, Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton (2005) are very strongly critical of organizational 
economics. In short, they argue that a self-fulfilling prophecy is created through (negative) 
theoretical assumptions about human motives and behavior being reinforced and diffused 
through the mechanisms of language, social norms, and institutional design; and in turn, the 
latter reflexively determines individual behavior in accordance with stated theoretical 
assumptions (also see Ghoshal, 2005: 77). The implication is that to the extent that economics 
                                                 
30 Concerning vertical integration, for example, Williamson (1985: 119-20) writes that “backward integration that 
lacks a transaction cost rationale or serves no strategic purposes will presumably be recognized and will be 
undone,” adding that mistakes will be corrected more quickly “if the firm is confronted with an active rivalry.” 
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successfully theorizes real mechanisms, particularly with respect to behavior, it is because much 
of social reality has already been fundamentally shaped by economics ideas and theories.  
We have serious problems with these arguments concerning the performativity of 
organizational economics. Consider Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton’s main example, the allegedly 
detrimental effect of the recent moves toward infusing hierarchies with market-like mechanisms 
which have resulted in downsizing and the “commodification” of employees. The driver of this, 
it seems, is solely the “rationalized institutional myth” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) of the “market 
metaphor.” However, there are strong reasons to believe that the infusion of markets into 
hierarchy is much more than a self-fulfilling rhetorical device with mostly negative 
consequences. Markets have so far consistently and for a very long time demonstrated a 
fabulous track record in economic history, which makes the ascription of “myth” to market 
performance inappropriate.  Moreover, what has worked in economies at large may also work in 
smaller economies, such as firms (e.g., Zenger and Hesterly, 1997).  
The last decades have indeed witnessed a strong tendency to “disaggregate” into smaller 
organizational units. Firm size appears to have decreased and firms are increasingly breaking up 
their internal organization into smaller molecular units with high-powered market-like 
incentives. This tendency has been facilitated by improvements in information technology, 
measurement methods and cost allocation that allow for better measurement of individual efforts 
and output, and which have prompted the adoption of smaller organizational units and for 
smaller firms (Zenger and Hesterly, 1997). Smaller organizations with more market-like 
mechanisms are better able to match incentives with effort (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Zenger, 1994).  High-powered incentives thus are better infused into smaller organizations such 
as partnerships, professional services firms being the quintessential example (see further, Felin 
and Foss, 2007).  
Organizational Sociology 
Organizational sociologists (e.g., Perrow, 1986) have typically had rather limited patience 
with organizational economics.31 However, organizational sociology may be of considerable 
indirect relevance for a rational-choice approach to organizational governance, by pointing to 
                                                 
31 The other side of the coin is that few rational choice sociologists have been interested in organizational 
sociology; a notable exception is Lindenberg [e.g., 2003] ). 
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explananda that have so far not been theorized in a rational-choice approach, and by pointing to 
other, potentially more fine-grained explanatory mechanisms.  Labor market economist and 
agency theorist, Robert Gibbons (1999, 2003, 2005) has long advocated such a view.  However, 
it remains that (non–rational-choice) organizational sociology and rational-choice approaches 
organizational governance are direct theoretical competitors when they address similar 
explananda. For example, concerning inter-organizational relations and firm boundaries, 
resource-dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1985) are direct competitors. And sociological new institutionalism (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) offer very different answers than economics-based new institutionalism 
(Williamson, 1985) concerning why specific organizational forms are adopted in a population of 
firms. Very different views of the rationale of incentives in organizations are forwarded 
(compare Pfeffer, Sutton and Ferraro [2005] and Zenger and Hesterly [1997]). And so on.  In 
other words, we see very different theoretical mechanisms being put forward to explain the 
same phenomena, and so far no “meta” models have emerged that can express these different 
mechanisms in a unified language.    
CONCLUSION 
Despite continuing questions about the scope of the relevant theories, their robustness to 
alternative behavioral assumptions, the degree to which they are substitutes or complements, 
and related issues, the broad set of rational-choice approaches to organizational governance 
discussed here have proved highly successful in explaining what firms are, what firms do, and 
how firms are structured.  Less is known about how firms change through time and how “soft” 
characteristics such as leadership, culture, and capabilities affect the performance of the firm.  
Still, modern theories of organizational governance have made considerable headway in 
shedding light on the core problems of firm organization and management. 
As described above, the most common theories of organizational governance differ in many 
details.  Still, they share important features:  an emphasis on maximizing behavior, imperfect 
and incomplete information, costs of monitoring or costs of contracting, and the like.  They 
share common roots in the explosion of “Coasian” approaches to economic organization that 
emerged in the mid 1970s.  Is this a weakness?  Almost two decades ago Paul Milgrom and 
John Roberts (1988b: 450) argued that the “incentive-based transaction costs theory has been 
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made to carry too much of the weight of explanation in the theory of organizations,” predicting 
that “competing and complementary theories” would emerge, “theories that are founded on 
economizing on bounded rationality and that pay more attention to changing technology and to 
evolutionary considerations.” However, no serious competitors have emerged so far.   
Why have behavioral, evolutionary, Austrian, and other “heterodox” approaches failed to 
make much headway?  One possibility is that mainstream organizational economics is 
sufficiently successful that competitors have a hard time gaining a foothold. Still, as we have 
stressed throughout this chapter, many of the critiques do in fact point to weaknesses in the 
theory of the firm that should ideally be remedied.  A further reason is that the critics tend to 
focus on phenomena that are difficult to model.  Innovation, entrepreneurship, bounded 
rationality, learning, evolutionary processes, and differential capabilities are examples of such 
phenomena. The formal tools that can handle such phenomena may not exist to a sufficient 
extent have been developed.  However, recent attempts to integrate entrepreneurship into the 
theory of the firm (Foss and Klein, 2005), to build bridges between the economic theory of the 
firm and theories of firm strategy and capabilities (Williamson, 1991; Nickerson and Vanden 
Bergh, 1999), and otherwise enhance approaches based on transaction cost suggest that 
organizational governance remains a rich field for further study. 
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                               Table 1: Streams of research in organizational economics 
 
 Conceptualiza- 
tion of the firm 
Rationality Contracting Organizational 
Governance 
Transaction costs
considered 
 
Nexus of contracts 
 
A legal fiction Maximizing Complete The reality of 
authority is denied. 
No substantive 
difference between 
market governance 
and organizational 
governance. Input 
monitoring 
dominates in 
organizations; output 
monitoring in 
markets. 
Ex post TC, e.g. 
monitoring and 
bonding costs 
 
Formal princi- 
pal/agent theory 
 
No distinct con-
ceptualization 
Maximizing Complete Insights in 
informativeness 
principle, incentive 
internsity, multi-
tasking, etc.; 
however, these are 
are not particular to 
organizations.   
Costs of monitoring
Incompl. contracts: 
coordination 
 
An authority re-
lation 
Mostly bounded Incomplete Authority is the 
defining 
characteristic of the 
firm.  
Haggling and 
communication cos
Incompl. contracts: 
asset spec. and 
prop. rights 
 
A collection of 
residual decision 
rights to physical 
assets 
Williamson: 
bounded 
Hart: maximizing 
Incomplete Ownership rights to 
alienable assets 
confer authority 
(Hart). Authority 
and hierarchy is a 
private ordering 
(Williamson).  
Costs of drafting 
complex contracts 
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